Volume 49, Issue 2

Leading motif for the article is the lack of serious historical research regarding the economic integration processes in Europe since the end of World War II. It starts with a closer look at the economic theory to examine its practicability to explain integration. The article continues with an investigation of the various phases of economic integration in the East and in the West after World War II. In addition to that, continuative questions are raised. The paper’s major hypothesis is, that integration in East and West was led by political issues rather than by questions of economic efficiency. In light of this, the limited economic effects are actually not surprising.

The possibility of enlarging Italy’s export market was the key factor that made industrialists repeatedly express their consent for a unified market, even in their earliest statements on the matter. The great majority of Italian business declared itself in favour of a united market dependent upon a given set of conditions: gradual abolition of tariffs, leveling of production costs among members, free circulation of workers (as well as of goods and capital) and inclusion in the Treaty of Art.109 on the resumption of tariff controls or measures of safeguard where a sudden crisis in the balance of payments occurs. The policy of Italian business towards EEC integration in those years was the result of a compromise between protectionist sectors (small-medium firms) on the one hand and, on the other, firms belonging to the so-called automobile cycle (Fiat, Pirelli etc.) and the engineering sector, whose growth had been led by export demand and favoured opening up the Italian economy to international competition. Once the Treaty of Rome was signed, there were issues that Italian industrialists did not like. However, on the whole, participation was never called into question and, despite a few skeptical voices, Italian business valued European integration as a unique opportunity to enlarge the market, increase foreign demand and improve competitiveness. The Italian economic miracle had begun to take shape.

This article examines the ideas and politics of the Federation of German Industry and two other peak associations of West German Industry concerning the integration of (Western) Europe. Their attitudes towards European integration were characterized, at least from the late 1950s, by a great degree of continuity: They supported the integration process not only for economic, but also for political reasons. Principal criticism was directed against dirigisme and poor efficiency, and in the dispute between the advocates of supranational and inter-governmental ideas they leaned towards the latter. All in all, the three most important German business associations practised, and practise to this day, a sort of pragmatic Europeanism.

Socialist economic integration’ in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)officially aimed at progressing from the member states’ bilateral trade to the bi- and multilateral coordination of production, research and development. The East German economy had, on the one hand, a vital interest in this international division of labour through political planning that stabilized markets for imports and exports and created economies of scale. On the other hand, politically planned specialization with the lower industrialized CMEA countries tended to preserve the existing structure of GDR industry instead of stimulating technological progress. The article illustrates this dilemma with a case study of the machine tool industry. In the 1970s, this highly qualified and traditionally trade-intensive branch fell behind the international trend that went from numerical control (NC) to computerized numerical control (CNC) technology. But the problem of declining international competitiveness was already detected in the 1960s and early 1970s regarding traditional NC machine tools. Evidence shows that even these less complex tasks could not be managed sufficiently by CMEA or bilateral integration measures.

The paper examines the effect of the Comecon negotiation on the development of automobile production in Czechoslovakia between 1949 and 1965. It investigates the reasons that led to the failure of a closer integration of automobile production in the Comecon bloc; it explores which and whose needs oriented the decision-making process and considers what consequences the failure of a more integrative policy had on the Czechoslovak enterprise koda. The paper sheds light on a specific project, elaborated in 1949 by the Czechoslovak specialists and intended to ensure the national producer a leading role in the Comecon international division of labour. The specialists’ effort to protect the national automobile industry was motivated by the strategic importance of the hard currency revenues of the export-led automobile production. The paper argues that the rejection of the Czechoslovak project and the Comecon failure to elaborate a coherent and technically affordable plan to establish a multilateral product specialization within the People′s democracies blocked the modernization of automobile production in Czechoslovakia for almost a decade, determining the decline of competitiveness of koda products on the Capitalist markets and trapping the country’s automobile industry in the Fordism in one country described by Abelshauser when discussing the GDR.

The article deals with the issue of countertrades, GDR foreign commerce enterprises contracted with western firms in order to secure the modernizing of its economy. It discusses the argument of whether those contracts could establish new forms of European East-Westintegration between Comecon and EEC economies. Starting from rather unfavorable general trading conditions in the 1950s and early 1960s, East Germany could intensify its trade relations with western countries in the late 1960s. Based on its international recognition in the late 1960s and early 1970s, it also got easier access to western credits to finance large-scale investment programs in the economy. With varying success and in order to refinance those imports from the West, GDR officials tried to conclude contracts pre-engaging western partners to accept mandatory deliveries by East German enterprises in return. The author defines three major forms of such contracts, distinguishable by the level and the type of GDR counter deliveries, agreed on by the contracting partners. Since East Germany failed to put through high levels of its own counter deliveries, these projects contributed to its long-term indebtedness. Moreover, this kind of business, unintentionally created potential losses in the GDR’s foreign trade firms due to various factors. Western companies themselves started to market East German products received in fulfillment of countertrade contracts. Western deliverers of investment goods managed to secure higher prices for their deliveries and lower ones for East German goods in order to subsidize the marketing of East German products they had taken over. That put additional pressure on the already decreasing competitiveness of East German export goods. Finally, the article presents a judgment on the advantages and disadvantages of the countertrade concept for East Germany itself.

This paper offers an overview of the development of European industry between 1700 and 1870, drawing in particular on the recent literature that has emerged following the formation of the European Historical Economics Society in 1991. The approach thus makes use of economic analysis and quantitative methods where appropriate. There are a number of important revisions, compared with previous accounts of Europe’s Industrial Revolution, particularly as embodied in the major existing textbooks on European economic history. First, the Industrial Revolution now emerges as a more gradual process than was once implied by the use of the take-off metaphor. Nevertheless, the scale of the structural transformation that occurred during the process of industrialisation continues to justify the use of the term Industrial Revolution. Second, although the emphasis on the central role of technological change is not new, we use economic analysis to shed new light on the process. Drawing on a model of technological choice first introduced by Paul David, we emphasise the importance of factor prices for the initial switch to modern capital intensive production methods in Britain, the rate of diffusion of these methods to other countries and path dependent technological change. In the cotton industry, particular emphasis is placed on the role of high wages, while in the iron industry, the price of coal is seen to play an important part. We also draw on the idea of a General Purpose Technology to evaluate the role of steam power.

The focus of the article is on the academic and political-economic symbiosis between the origins of neoliberalism and the economics of fascism during the 1930s. This approach is crucial for answering open research questions such as the contribution of Ordnungspolitik to the efforts to overcome the world depression and mass unemployment in Germany and the new openness of conservative economic thinking toward the reform of liberalism in the thirties and, even more importantly, toward Soziale Marktwirtschaft after 1945. Furthermore the analysis of the very nature of liberal interventionism and competitive order underlines the special features of the German social market economy in comparison with current versions of neoliberalism.

Historians often regard family firms as a phenomenon typical of the early phases of industrialisation. It has been argued that the family was of great importance for early industrial enterprises.The family provided vital resources like capital, business connections, managers, commercial know-how and technical training facilities etc. But with the emergence of a modern banking system, professional managers and technical and commercial schools, the entrepreneurial family gradually lost these functions. The evidence of this case study on Saxony suggests rather different conclusions: (1.) The family’s function for early industrial firms seems to be less vital than often assumed. Since in Saxony up until the end of the 19th century a majority of founders came from family backgrounds outside of the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, they could not rely on resources transmitted by an established bourgeois family. (2.) In many respects industrial enterprises owned by families were a rather modern phenomenon. The emergence of family firms seems to be connected to the typical challenges of personal enterprises: Inheritance laws and practices made it difficult to pass businesses on to the next generation without impairing the firm′s liquidity. Thus ownership of industrial enterprises was transferred to increasingly wider circles of people related to each other by kinship. (3.) Family firms pursued a meaningful purpose beyond the mere maximisation of profits. Family circumstances could very well lead to serious problems for family businesses: The early death of the owner-entrepreneur could leave the firm with successors not old enough to take over the firm’s management; succeeding sons might not be suited for their assigned task; the growth of the firm could be hampered by the family’s refusal to mobilise outside capital. But challenges were often met by responses suitable to solve problems inherent to family businesses and to compensate for certain handicaps. Moreover, family based firms could count on resources, especially in times of crisis, which could be vital for survival. Thus, it seems that family became rather more important for business between the middle of the 19th and the middle of the 20th century.

Before World War I the modern insurance industry had spread out across the globe from This article introduces a new methodology to approximate education in terms of numerical abilities and numerical discipline based on age-misreporting in population statistics. We review why age heaping is a helpful indicator for education and describe potential problems in applying this strategy. The study presents human capital estimates for the early modern period in a number of places in Northern and Western Germany. Based on individual population census data for Schleswig-Holstein, we show time trends and regional disparities in the evolution of human capital. Our preliminary results indicate that urbanization, Protestantism and protein proximity may have led to stronger numeracy.