Volume 223, Issue 3

This paper contributes to the analysis of the money supply process in Germany during the period of monetary targeting by the Bundesbank from 1975-1998. While the standard money multiplier approach assumes that the money stock is determined by the money multiplier and the monetary base it is argued here that both the money stock and the monetary base are determined endogenously by the optimizing behavior of commercial banks and private agents like households and firms. An industrial organization style model for the money creating sector that describes the money creation process is developed assuming that the main policy variable of the central bank is the money market interest rate. A vector error correction model for the nominal money stock, the monetary base, nominal income, short-term and long-term interest rates, and the required reserve rate is specified, and the interaction between these variables is analyzed empirically. The evidence contradicts the money multiplier approach and supports the presented model of the money creating sector. Zusammenfassung Dieser Beitrag enthält eine Analyse des Geldangebotsprozesses in Deutschland für den Zeitraum der Geldmengensteuerung durch die Bundesbank von 1975-1998. Im Standard-Erklärungsansatz für das Geldangebot, dem Geldmultiplikatormodell, wird angenommen, dass die Geldmenge von der Geldbasis und dem Geldmultiplikator bestimmt wird. Im Gegensatz zu diesem Konzept wird hier ein Modell vorgestellt, in dem sowohl die Geldmenge als auch die Geldbasis aus dem optimierenden Verhalten der Banken und der Haushalte resultieren. Die Grundlage für dieses Modell bildet der Industrial Organization-Ansatz der Bankentheorie. Die Politikvariable der Zentralbank ist der kurzfristige Geldmarktzins. Es wird ein Vektorfehlerkorrekturmodell für die Variablen Geldmenge, Geldbasis, Bruttoinlandsprodukt, kurz- und langfristiger Zins sowie Mindestreservesatz spezifiziert. Mit Hilfe dieses Modells werden die Beziehungen zwischen den Variablen empirisch untersucht. Die empirischen Ergebnisse stehen im Widerspruch zum Geldmultiplikatormodell. Vielmehr unterstützen sie das hier dargestellte theoretische Geldangebotsmodell.

This paper illustrates the effects of item-nonresponse in surveys on the results of multivariate statistical analysis when estimation of producitivity is the task. To multiply impute the missing data the “data augmentation” algorithm is applied. Data of the IAB Establishment Panel 2000 are used to estimate the plant’s productivity. Basis of the empirical analysis is a translog production function with labour and capital as input factors. Also the influence of industries and the use of modern technologies are considered. Furthermore, we include interaction variables that indicate deviations in the parameters concerning the two parts of Germany. Next to differences between industries, we find also a higher productivity, if modern technologies are installed. The results for Eastern and Western Germany only differ for some industries and the constant. Using only the available cases these differences seem to be biased. Calculating the regression coefficients using the imputed data sets and combining the results according to the multiple imputation principle reduce these deviations about 10 %-points. In addition the differences of the industrial branches between east and west decrease.

An empirical analysis with representative data from the IAB establishment panel shows that in 2000 just one out of two establishments in western Germany and only one out of four establishments in eastern Germany were covered by industry-wide or firm-specific collective agreements. Industry-wide coverage rates have fallen in recent years. Theoretical explanations point, inter alia, to transaction cost considerations and to micro- and macroeconomic changes. Econometric analyses indicate that the probability of being bound by a collective agreement rises with establishment size and with the share of qualified employees. Branch plants are more likely, family-name firms and newly founded firms are less likely to be bound by such agreements. Larger establishments, branch plants and establishments with works councils are also less likely to withdraw from industry-wide agreements.

The present paper analyzes how multinationals respond to international transfer pricing methods. To evaluate transfer pricing methods, a neutrality criterion is developed. The analysis reveals that an indirect determination of transfer prices by using the unitary taxation method is neutral as it does not distort economic decisions. Any direct regulation of transfer prices by applying standard methods is neutral only under very restrictive assumptions.