Band 31, Heft 4

This dialogue was produced by an email exchange, with each email limited to 200 words. The exchange took place between 21 January and 9 June, 2021. No edits were allowed once ‘send’ had been pressed and there was to be no other correspondence between the participants for the duration of the dialogue. The Call for Papers for this special issue of Human Affairs was the starting point and there was no other pre-planning.

A narrative element is essential to philosophy, because nothing gets going in it without some vision, some story about what the world, or the subject, is like. The argumentative element can only structure the story from the inside; it can never prove it true. And, whatever clarification arguments provide for the story, the latter remains in all its ambiguous glory, ready to originate new arguments and to spawn new visions.

I argue that good communication is vital to philosophy’s project of understanding truth. I consider what good communication would involve, especially with regards to the needs of a popular philosophy magazine such as Philosophy Now . What makes a good or bad article? And how can one edit oneself for clarity? Finally I consider the difference the internet makes. and some of its implications for future philosophers.

As a philosopher and a reflective practitioner of philosophy in schools, I explore two aspects of presentation which I call unveiling and packaging . Both aspects bear on the work of designing and facilitating philosophy workshops for school students. I describe unveiling philosophy as a practice of collaborative inquiry and dialogic argument: social processes that foster thinking skills and dispositions, an evaluativist epistemology, and a range of constructive norms. I then discuss packaging philosophical materials in ways that create effective stimuli for thinking. I encourage educators engaged in designing or curating stimuli to draw on the rich diversity of available media, to focus on the quality of both the philosophical content and its creative expression, and to ensure that the content connects with students’ life experiences. I propose five criteria for judging the likely effectiveness of a philosophical stimulus: that it activate emotion, induce perplexity, challenge intuitions, ignite controversy and elicit reasoned argument. I offer three detailed examples of high school philosophy workshops to illustrate the practical application of these criteria, and to illuminate fruitful possibilities for arranging stimuli, including using a Provocation-Complication sequence or arranging stimuli as elements in a more complex puzzle.

Philosophy often at least implicitly includes and depends on a logical structure which is also that of jokes. This is the case when philosophy involves questioning or establishing concepts in their own right, and when it involves the kinds of metaphysics which ask about reality and the world as a whole or as such. Taking this humour-like structure into account in presenting philosophy helps, among other things, to lay open part of the character of philosophy itself, to underscore the radical self-perspective that is constitutive of philosophy, and to contextualise the often confusing experience of coming to grips with an unfamiliar philosophical framework.

In its original Greek conception, philosophy was intended to promote both wisdom and virtue among society; in this sense, the teaching, or presenting, of philosophy is central to its essence. Socrates and Plato famously grappled with the question of how to impart wisdom and virtue to the learner, with mixed results. One of the standard methods—reading and writing—was argued to be misleading and even deceptive, because it deals with static, ‘dead’ words and ideas rather than with the “living discourse” of one person speaking directly to another. This general critique of certain ‘technologies’ of learning is even more relevant today, in our technological age, where the presenting of philosophy often involves computers, laptops, and the Internet. Such things come to function as addictive drugs—much like the pharmakon that Plato warned of. Philosophy would thus be better served by less use of mediating technologies and by a return to live, interactive, living dialogue between student and teacher.

Books and journal articles have become the dominant modes of presentation in contemporary philosophy. This historically contingent paradigm prioritises textual expression and assumes a distinction between philosophical practice and its presented product. Using Socrates and Diogenes as exemplars, we challenge the presumed supremacy of the text and defend the importance of ways of life as modes of practiced presentation . We argue that text cannot capture the embodied activity of philosophy without remainder, and is therefore limited and incomplete. In particular, we contend that (1) a static text is essentially alienated from our practices of philosophising, (2) words cannot unambiguously represent lives, and (3) practiced presentation enriches our understanding beyond words alone. After discussing some pedagogical implications, we conclude with a plea for a pluralistic approach that recognises lives as legitimate and valuable modes of philosophical presentation.

Presenting philosophy properly, in a way that is clear and accessible to our target audience, is of paramount importance. In this essay I draw on my dual experience as a scientist and a philosopher (as well as science and philosophy communicator) to arrive at some general recommendations for good practice. Specifically, I discuss why presentation matters, whether a bad presentation style is a valid criticism of a philosopher’s work, how we may adapt our message to the variety of communication media available today, and what, if any, is the relationship between how we present and how we conceive of philosophy itself.

When it comes to questions about alternative visions for philosophical engagement, Heidegger’s work makes for an interesting case study, especially if we focus on his texts from the turbulent 1930s. As a shortcut into this contested territory, it is instructive to examine Heidegger’s anti-journalistic gestures, centered on the question whether this animosity is bound to drive a wedge between, or rather prompt a re-approximation of, philosophy and public scholarship. To render this programmatic concern more specific, the present essay aims to reassess Heidegger’s profile by considering his account of language as the “most dangerous of goods” bestowed on humans. This theme can serve as an expedient starting point for scrutinizing philosophers’ self-understanding as daring explorers in pursuit of profound insights into the human condition, and their (in)ability to balance excitement and sobriety.

This essay examines the relationship between academic and public philosophy through the lens of Heidegger studies. Specifically, this essay: shows how Heidegger uses technical terminology within the context of the academy to break new philosophical ground; explains how suitably clarified technical terminology can be used to introduce people to Heidegger’s philosophy and to apply Heidegger’s ideas to current affairs; and illustrates how the application of Heidegger’s ideas to contemporary issues results in new forms of academic research. Ultimately, this essay argues that there is a dialectical relationship between academic and public philosophy: i.e., public philosophy translates esoteric ideas developed in the academy into publicly accessible prose and then applies those ideas to daily life; but in doing so, public philosophy inspires new lines of academic inquiry.

Philosophy is presented in a wide range of forms, none of which can be convincingly claimed to be the “genuine” one. Historically speaking, there is not one “proper” way of doing philosophy, evidencing what may be called the social contingency of philosophy. This paper aims to provide a “critical” philosophy of today, in the Kantian sense of a philosophy that reflects on the conditions of its possibility, and thereby acknowledges the limitations they impose. Conceptually, our approach is grounded in Niklas Luhmann’s social systems theory, in which “functional differentiation” and “second-order observation” are two crucial characteristics of modern society. The paper discusses how presentations of philosophy align themselves with the second-order observation mechanisms of the specific social systems in which they are “hosted.” This paper deals in particular with two such systems: academics and social (or mass) media. These forms of presenting philosophy produce two different kinds of philosophy presenters: the expert and the influencer.

Today the way philosophical work is presented is very narrowly circumscribed and as a result, this excludes people who do not want to, or cannot effectively, present their work in a particular manner. This canonization of the mode of presentation of philosophical work also serves to maintain the status quo of analytic philosophy as an exclusively academic discipline. In this paper I argue that diversity in how philosophical thinking is presented should be allowed, and even, encouraged. I argue that it is in philosophy’s interest to expand the ways that it is presented, because not doing so not only limits who can participate in philosophy, but it also limits who philosophy attracts and so how far-reaching philosophy can be.

In contemporary academic philosophy, Chinese Philosophy remains a niche. This has a lot to do with its presentation, which often creates an impression of alienness and allegory, making its contribution, especially to analytical questions, not obvious. This paper examines how a change in presentation eases the inclusion of Chinese Philosophy into the mainstream. On the assumption that there has been an “activist turn” in the discipline in general, philosophical interest in a tradition that ranges from conceptual analysis, to ethics and politics, but that is ultimately focused on motivating actions, becomes more relevant and pressing. Since, in much of Chinese Philosophy, the philosopher is an activist, if the wider discipline is indeed undergoing an “activist turn”, then there is a connection here that should be made. In this paper, the connection is explained using two examples, Mozi and Xu Fuguan.

In this paper I distinguish between illustrative and performative uses of artworks in the teaching and communication of philosophy, drawing examples from the history of art and my own practice. The former are where works are used merely to illustrate and communicate a philosophical idea or argument, the latter are where the artist or teacher philosophizes through the creation of art. I hope to promote future collaboration between philosophers, art historians and artists, with artworks becoming catalysts for artistic-philosophical investigation, thus revitalizing the idea of universities embodying ongoing and open-ended conversations.