Band 23, Heft 4

This paper provides a sketch of a fresh conception of the “metaphysics” of culture and a sense of its conceptual power and advantages, based on a post-Darwinian account of the artifactual, hybrid nature of a person, chiefly in terms of (what I treat as terms of art) Bildung (“external” and “internal”), Sittlichkeit (both descriptive and normative), and interpretation (diversely manifested in different sectors of inquiry). I consider the (“metaphysical”) relationship between membership in the species Homo sapiens sapiens and functioning as a person the generic distinction of human cultures (enlanguaged cultures), which I call Intentionality (that is, whatever is culturally significant or significative); and the bearing of the thesis on familiar philosophical quarrels and theory of the sciences.

The author notes that European spiritual culture has provided the world with two great myths: the myth of Jesus Christ and the Promethean myth. These two myths were an early indication of the rise of the hidden predatory spiritual paradigm. As a result of this paradigm (setting), later culture hypertrophically strengthened the human genetic predisposition towards an aggressive adaptive strategy. It is therefore necessary, according to the author, to expose and criticize this predatory paradigm and eventually transform it into a biophilic paradigm. If we want to understand this requirement, we need a higher-order theory, an evolutionary ontological theory of culture. One of the ways of achieving this objective is to weaken and criticize the myth in which the defiant Prometheus acts as an honored civilization hero. In the second part the author briefly introduces his evolutionary-ontological concept of culture. He defends the claim that culture is an artificial system with its own internal information and that two types of order have come into existence within culture in harmony with this information (spiritual culture): 1. strictly information-prescribed structures (specifically the material culture and technology), 2. Spontaneously (through succession) originating structures (especially institutions). If we want to change the orientation of the cultural system, we have to change not only its current information but also its former spiritual setting (paradigm).

The article discusses possible ways of overcoming the environmental crisis. It is based on Šmajs’ evolutionary ontological understanding of the environmental crisis of nature, which distinguishes between natural and cultural evolution and demonstrates the opposing relationships between them. It critically develops one of Šmajs’ proposals for initiating a biophilic transformation of culture by dealing with some of the consequences of the economic crisis (specifically unemployment).

The main aims of this paper are to establish the position of evolutionary ontology within the Czech environmental debate, to identify why its untapped potential may be an inspiration in other social science disciplines and, finally, to suggest that evolutionary ontology be reconfigured in a particular way so that it can capitalize on its potential. A brief introduction outlines the context and the main ideas of evolutionary ontology and is followed by a discussion of its weaknesses: an emphasis on a confrontational style in addressing other social science disciplines and ignoring the specific nature of the disciplines which represent the main target group of this theory. Consequently, I suggested three main changes as to how evolutionary ontology should be presented.

The author of the article deals with the causes of anti-naturalism in culture today from the point view of both a philosophical conception of evolutionary ontology, and the psychology of environmental problems. He highlights the real potential for a biophilic transformation of culture in the context of current knowledge on cognitive psychology, where emphasis is placed on the limits to the phenomena of cognitive dissonance. The author of the article seeks certain options to repress these limits in Gestalt theory, which on some aspects corresponds substantially to the insights and goals of evolutionary psychology.

This article is written from the perspective of Josef Šmajs’ evolutionary ontology and considers physical activity in humans. It focuses in detail on a particular form—physical exercise. In the author’s opinion, current physical exercise (sport activity) and any other human form of activity is part of the internal autopoietic processes of the sociocultural system, which displays an ever-increasingly destructive tendency towards its natural environment—towards the host system of the biosphere. The author attempts to establish the degree and manner to which the anti-nature activity of physical exercise varies, but also seeks to point out how they contribute to a potential biophilic transformation of culture.

J. Šmajs’ concept of evolutionary ontology has attracted much attention in recent years especially in Czech and Slovak academic circles, yet it remains, as some of its proponents claim, undervalued in Britain and the US. Even in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, there are, in addition to its strong supporters, several authors who almost a priori reject the concept, pointing to several questionable, contradictory or even mutually exclusive or self-refuting arguments. In this paper, mainly based on a comprehensive analysis of the first part of Šmajs’ book, Evoluční ontologie kultury a problém podnikání (2012) [Evolutionary Ontology of Culture and The Issues Of Business], we attempt to demonstrate that the opponents of Šmajs’ concept are closer to the truth, since the concept, we believe, is just another variation on the extreme escalation of philosophical naturalism.

Neuropragmatism is a research program taking sciences about cognitive development and learning methods most seriously, in order to reevaluate and reformulate philosophical issues. Knowledge, consciousness, and reason are among the crucial philosophical issues directly affected. Pragmatism in general has allied with the science-affirming philosophy of naturalism. Naturalism is perennially tested by challenges questioning its ability to accommodate and account for knowledge, consciousness, and reason. Neuropragmatism is in a good position to evaluate those challenges. Some ways to defuse them are suggested here, along with recommendations about the specific kind of naturalism, a pluralistic and perspectival naturalism, that neuropragmatism should endorse.

Cognitive science and its philosophy have been far too long consumed with representation. This concern is indicative of a creeping Cartesianism that many scientists and philosophers wish to evade. However, their naturalism is often insufficiently evolutionary to fully appreciate the lessons of pragmatism. If cognitive neuroscience and pragmatism are to be mutually beneficial, the representational-friendly scientists and the anti-representational pragmatists need an alternative to representation that still accounts for what many find so attractive about representation, namely intentionality. I propose that instead of representations we philosophers and scientists begin thinking in terms of cultural affordances. Like Gibsonian affordances, cultural affordances are opportunities for action. However, unlike Gibsonian affordances, which are merely biological and available for immediate action in the immediately present environment, cultural affordances also present opportunities for thinking about the past and acting into the future—tasks typically attributed to representations.

I propose the next steps in the neuropragmatic approach to philosophy that has been advocated by Solymosi and Shook (2013). My focus is the initial process of inquiry implicit in addressing philosophical questions of cognition and mind by utilizing the tools of neuroscientific research. I combine John Dewey’s pattern of inquiry with Charles Peirce’s three forms of inference in order to outline a methodological schema for neuropragmatic inquiry. My goal is to establish ignorance and guessing as well-defined pillars of methodology upon which to build a neuropragmatic approach to inquiry. First, I outline Dewey’s pattern of inquiry, highlighting the initial problematic phase in which recognized ignorance provides the basis upon which to frame a philosophical problem and initiate the trajectory by which philosophical questions may be addressed with the assistance of neuroscientific evidence. Second, I provide an outline of Peirce’s three forms of inference, focusing upon the first phase of abduction: guessing. Third, I explain the transition between ignorance and guessing, urging the benefit of attending to these two aspects of inquiry. Finally, I provide an initial sketch indicating the next steps concerning a pragmatic reconstruction of neurophilosophy, pointing towards the need for a more thorough examination of scientific methodology within and following analyses of philosophical problems and neuroscientific evidence.

We come prepared to track events and objects, building our knowledge base while foraging for coherence. Classical pragmatism recognizes that the acquisition of knowledge is in part a contact sport (e.g. Peirce, Dewey). One of the aims of neuroscience is to capture human experience. One route to perhaps achieve this may be through the study of the visual system and its expansion in our evolutionary history. Embodied cephalic systems, as Dewey knew well, are tied to self-corrective inquiry. A philosophy of neuroscience needs to capture how such events are tracked, tested through experience, and subsequently modified in the brain to comprise a knowledge base.

For most of human history, human knowledge was considered to be something that was stored and captured by words. This began to change when Galileo said that the book of nature is written in the language of mathematics. Today, Dan Dennett and many others argue that all genuine scientific knowledge is in the form of mathematical algorithms. However, recently discovered neurocomputational algorithms can be used to justify the claim that there is genuine knowledge which is non-algorithmic. The fact that these algorithms use prototype deployment, rather than mathematics or logic, gives us good reason to believe that there is a kind of knowledge that we derive from stories that is different from our knowledge of algorithms. Even though we would need algorithms to build a system that can make sense out of stories, we do not need to use algorithms when we ourselves embody a system that learns from stories. The success of the Galilean perspective in the physical sciences has often resulted in an attempt to mathematize the humanities. I am arguing that the dynamic neurocomputational perspective can give us a better understanding of how we get knowledge and wisdom from the stories told by disciplines such as Literature, History, Anthropology and Theology. This new neurological data can be used to justify the traditional pedagogy of these disciplines, which originally stressed the telling of stories rather than the learning of algorithms.

The paper proposes an outline of a reconciliatory approach to the perennial controversy between epistemological realism and anti-realism (constructionism). My main conceptual source in explaining this view is the philosophy of pragmatism, more specifically, the epistemological theories of George H. Mead, John Dewey, and also William James’ radical empiricism. First, the paper analyzes the pragmatic treatment of the goal-directedness of action, especially with regard to Mead’s notion of attitudes, and relates it to certain contemporary epistemological theories provided by the cognitive sciences (Maturana, Rizzolatti, Clark). Against this background, the paper presents a philosophical as well as empirical justification of why we should interpret the environment and its objects in terms of possibilities for action. In Mead’s view, the objects and events of our world emerge within stable patterns of organism-environment interactions, which he called “perspectives”. According to pragmatism as well as the aforementioned cognitive scientists, perception and other cognitive processes include not only neural processes in our heads but also the world itself. Elaborating on Mead’s concept of perspectives, the paper argues in favor of the epistemological position called “constructive realism.”

In this article we present a qualitative analysis of empirical findings from an international project on intergroup attitudes and contact in five Central European countries specifically concerning language use. The project concentrated on the interplay of intergroup contact and perception between the members of national groups in the borderlands between the Czech Republic and Austria, Germany, Poland and Slovakia. The open statements analysed here about the contact situations and the ensuing evaluation of the Others were collected as part of an online questionnaire (N=1959). After a short theoretical introduction we reveal the intertwined nature of construing language use: first in each specific borderland, then in the triads speaking together either in the native language of one of the groups (Czechs with Austrians and Germans) or with each speaking their own native languages (Czechs with Poles and Slovaks). Finally we highlight several effects we have observed as a result of being able to compare the situation in more than one neighbourhood, for instance, the effect of the different statuses of the languages involved, or the connection between the language used in contact and a feeling of proximity.

Various approaches and methods are used in philosophical counselling. Two main trends can be observed: the first is the use of contemplative methods and the second constitutes approaches based on dialogical critical thinking. The author defends the idea that developing philosophical counselling on the basis of critical thinking presupposes that it is possible for counsellor and client to hold a philosophical dialogue where the relationship is one of expert/lay person. J. Šulavík has described this relationship in greater detail. In the Socratic model, the philosopher and the lay person hold a dialogue whereby they ascertain opinions via inductive comparison and by defining things, creating a shared concept. While the Platonic and Enlightenment models were grounded in the authority of the expert philosopher, in the Socratic and postmodern models, the expert philosopher loses the power to manipulate those who know “less”. Lay people are not passive consumers of a particular “optimal” philosophy but through their own “philosophising” create philosophy and tailor it for themselves. While philosophising, therefore, the philosopher does not take on the role of “producer” of philosophy but of “adviser” (consultant). It is therefore supposed that people have a general need for philosophy and that ultimately they should create and reflect upon their own philosophy.

Cybercrime in Nigeria is largely perpetrated by young people and students in tertiary institutions, and are socially tagged yahoo yahoo or yahoo boys. Yahoo boys rely on their computer dexterity to victimise unsuspecting persons in cyberspace. A new phenomenon in cybercrime is mixing spiritual elements with internet surfing to boost cybercrime success rates. This paper examines the factors underlying this spiritual dimension (cyber spiritualism) to cybercrime, and discusses some of the strategies employed in perpetuating cyber crime. Using Space Transition Theory of cybercrime, data were generated on yahoo boys and those involved in yahoo plus. The clampdown on Internet fraudsters by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), in-group conflict among yahoo boys over social recognition, reduced victimisation and delayed success, and mass media enlightenment were reported factors influencing the fusion of spiritual elements in cyber crime. The methods used include ase or mayehun (incontrovertible order), charmed or magical rings (oruka-ere) and incisions made around the wrist, which are used to surf the net, while ijapa (tortoise) is used to navigate profitable sites. Unsuspecting victims fall under the spell of the ase via phone conversation where spiritual orders are made to the victims without their objecting.