Volume 9, Issue 1

This paper deals with the modern theory of social cost-benefit analysis in a dynamic economy. The theory emphasizes the role of a comprehensive, forward looking, dynamic welfare index within the period of the project rather than that of a project’s long-term consequences. However, what constitutes such a welfare index remains controversial in the recent literature. In this paper, we attempt to shed light on the issue by deriving three equivalent cost-benefit rules for evaluating a small project. In particular, we show that the direct change in a net national product (NNP) qualifies as a convenient welfare index without involving any other induced side effects. The project evaluation criterion thus becomes the present discounted value of the direct changes in NNP over the project period. We also illustrate the application of this theory in a few stylized examples.

Studies of structural change induced by environmental taxation usually proceed in a perfect-competition framework and typically find structural change to be quite moderate under realistic emission reduction scenarios. By observing that some of the industries affected are likely to operate under imperfect rather than perfect competition, additional mechanisms emerge which may amplify structural change beyond the extent identified as yet. Especially, changes in economies of scale may arise which weaken or strengthen the competitive position of industries over and above the initial cost effect. Using a computable general equilibrium model for Germany to examine the effects of a unilaterally introduced carbon tax, we find that induced structural change is more pronounced under imperfect competition than under perfect competition. At the macroeconomic level, we find that aggregate losses in economies of scale are larger than aggregate gains, implying that the total costs of environmental regulation are higher under imperfect competition than under perfect competition.

This paper presents a comprehensive view of lifetime taxation including both explicit taxation through the general tax system and implicit taxation via the retirement benefit formula. Differences in productivity between individuals are unobservable, which provides a rationale for the use of distortionary taxes. It is shown that the optimal structure of age-dependent taxation can be characterized by a generalized Ramsey formula. Furthermore, the paper derives the optimal retirement benefit formula in the presence of the general tax system and examines the compatibility with the financial stability of the pension system.

Which factors caused the growing international competitiveness of German mechanical engineering industry in the pre-World War I period? In this paper, we want to address this question and elucidate whether or not the international market success of machine builders in the German Empire was determined by technological creativity and the availability of a comparatively cheap labour force. Based on an unbalanced panel, we therefore investigate the influence of demand, labour costs and technological creativity on export performance of 32 different machinery types. We find robust evidence that the development of export- import ratios in mechanical engineering was positively influenced by the growth of patent stocks that represent the new knowledge being available for German machine builders. In addition, we present some evidence for the assumption that the growing international competitiveness of German mechanical engineering was also caused by decreasing relative unit labour cost.

In one-shot investment games where each player’s payoff is a convex combination of own and other’s profit, we measure trust by the amount given to the trustee and trustworthiness by the amount returned to the trustor by the trustee. Does the degree of payoff interdependence increase both trust and trustworthiness or one but not the other or neither of them? According to our experimental data, trust remains unaffected by the extent of interdependence whereas trustworthiness reacts positively to it.

Experimental studies of expectation formation of subjects are predominantly limited to the prediction of one single time series despite the practical relevance of expectations in situations with multiple sources of information. In this paper, we report on an experiment in which subjects are given time series (indicators) as additional information for the judgemental forecast of a stationary time series. The quality and the number of these indicators are varied in three versions of a forecasting experiment. We explore the effects on forecasting accuracy and we test the average forecasts of the subjects for consistency with the rational expectations hypothesis. A simple heuristic is presented that explains the average forecasting behavior better than the rational expectations if indicators are presented to the subjects. It is demonstrated by a simulation study that this result is representative for the considered stationary stochastic processes.