Volume 19, Issue 3

This paper models the feasibility of common policy initiatives against global terrorism, as well as timelines for their enforcement. The empirical evidence is based on 78 developing countries for the period 1984-2008. Domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism variables are used. Absolute (or unconditional) and conditional catch-ups are estimated using Generalised Method of Moments. We establish consistently that, the rate of catch-up is higher in domestic terrorism relative to transnational terrorism. The time to full catch-up required for the implementation of common policies without distinction of nationality is found to be in a horizon of 13-20 years for domestic terrorism and 24-28 years for transnational terrorism. Hence, from a projection date of 2009, in spite of decreasing cross-country differences in terrorists’ attacks, there is still a long way to go before feasible common policy initiatives can be fully implemented without distinction of nationality. The paper is original by its contribution to the empirics of conflict resolution through decreasing cross-country differences in terrorism tendencies. Policy implications are discussed.

This paper uses recent legislation in Austria to establish a link between sovereign reputation and yield spreads. In 2009, Hypo Alpe Adria International, a bank previously co-owned by the regional government of Carinthia, had been nationalized by Austria’s central government in order to avoid a default triggering multi-billion Euro local government guarantees. In 2015, special legislation retroactively introduced collective action clauses allowing a haircut on both the bonds and the guarantees while avoiding formal default. We document that legislative and administrative action designed to partly abrogate the guarantees resulted in a loss of reputation, leading to higher yield spreads for sovereign debt. Our analysis of covered bonds uncovers an increase in yield spreads on the secondary market and a deterioration of primary market conditions.

This paper models a purely informational mechanism behind the incumbency advantage. In a two-period electoral campaign with two policy issues, an incumbent and a possibly more competent challenger compete for election by voters who are heterogeneously informed about the state of the world. Due to the asymmetries in government responsibility between candidates, the incumbent’s statement may convey information on the relevance of the issues to voters. In equilibrium, the incumbent sometimes strategically releases his statement early and thus signals the importance of his signature issue to the voters. We find that, since the incumbent’s positioning on the issue reveals private information which the challenger can use in later statements, the incumbent’s incentives to distort the campaign are decreasing in his quality, as previously documented by the empirical literature. The distortions arising in equilibrium are decreasing in the incumbent’s true competence; however, the distortions may be increasing in the incumbent’s expected competence on his signature issue.

We propose the application of digit analysis using the Benford law to indicate managerial engagement in the capital allocation process. First, we motivate the potential of the Benford digit analysis to identify allocation outcomes that are shaped by human engagement instead of fixed decision rules. Second, we provide a case study to illustrate how the Benford digit analysis can be used to detect allocations affected by managerial interventions. We are unaware of any study applying the Benford test to internal capital markets, while this approach appears very useful in this context. It is commonly used in the auditing, financial accounting, and fraud detection literature.

We investigate German banks’ exposure to interest rate risk. In finance, higher demand for a risky asset is typically associated with higher expected return. However, employing a utility function which implies both risk-averse and risk-seeking behavior depending on the level of profits, we show that this relationship may get weaker and even change its sign at low profit levels. For the period 2005-14, we find not only the common positive relationship of higher expected returns and rising interest rate exposure but also that this relationship does become weaker with falling operative income, its sign eventually changing.

One of the pervasive problems with means-tested public long-term care programs is their inability to prevent individuals who could afford private long-term services from taking advantage of public care. They often manage to elude the means-test net through ‘strategic impoverishment’. We show in a simple model how this problem comes about, how it affects welfare and how it can be mitigated.