Volume 18, Issue 1

This study estimates the earning losses of workers experiencing an involuntary job separation. We employ, for the first time in the earning losses literature, a Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood estimator with fixed effects that has several advantages with respect to conventional fixed effects models. The Poisson estimator allows considering the full set of involuntary separations, including those with zero labor market earnings because of unemployment. By including individuals with zero earnings and by using our new method, the loss in the year of separation becomes larger than in previous studies. The loss starts with roughly 30% and, although it quickly shrinks, it remains at around 15% in the following years. In addition, we find that compared to other reasons for separation, the earning loss pattern is unique for involuntary separations, because no other type of separation implies such permanent scarring. This latter finding makes us confident that the self-reported involuntariness of a separation is a reliable source of information.

We analyze the impact that the educational level of candidates running for the position of mayor has on electoral turnout by using a large dataset for Italyn municipal elections held between 1993 and 2011. We firstly estimate a municipality fixed effects model and show that the median education of candidates standing in an election is positively correlated with turnout. To handle endogeneity issues arising from the unobservable time variant features of electoral races, we build on the literature which shows that politicians’ educational level is positively affected by their wage and apply a Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design on the basis of the fact that the wages of mayors in Italy increase non-monotonically at different thresholds. Results show that an exogenous increase in the median educational level of candidates, induced by a higher wage, leads to an increase in turnout of about 1 percentage point.

This paper puts seminal contributions to theory of production functions and maximization of explicit quantitative objective functions by Johann Heinrich von Thünen into a systematic historical perspective. We show that his comprehensive ‘Tableau Economiques’ do imply two exact parametric production functions. Moreover, the renowned ‘geometric mean wage’ formula is restated as an exact CES marginal labor productivity wage for σ= 2. We review four alternative modes of normative (natural) wage calculations without an explicit production function, and conclude that von Thünen’s natural wage differentiation formulas are bona fide alternatives for deriving the natural wage formula.

When agents compete for a bonus and their productivity in each of several possible occasions depends stochastically on (constant) effort, the number of times this is checked to assign the bonus affects the level of uncertainty in the selection process. Uncertainty, in turn, is expected to increase the effort made by competing agents (Cowen and Glazer, 1996; Dubey and Haimanko, 2003; Dubey and Wu, 2001). Theoretical predictions are derived and experimental evidence is collected for two competing agents, with the bonus awarded to that agent who outperforms the other. Sampling occasions (1 or 3), cost of production (high or low), cost symmetry (asymmetric or symmetric), and piece-rate reward are manipulated factorially to test the robustness of the effects of uncertainty. For control, a single-agent case is included. Results indicate that, for tournaments, greater uncertainty does indeed lead to greater than expected effort and lower average variable costs.

As long as it is employed cautiously enough, the model approach is a useful tool to estimate simultaneously the size and the development of the shadow economy in several countries. However, a second method is necessary to calibrate the model. The currency demand approach can lead to highly implausible results; the size of the shadow economy might be largely overestimated. An alternative is the survey method. For real tests of whether a variable has an impact, procedures are necessary that do not use the same variables as those used to construct the indicator. Thus, to make progress in analysing the shadow economy, the model approach has a role to play, but it has to be complemented by other methods employing different data. The currency demand approach cannot be used as long as it employs the same variables for its constructions.

In this reply to Kirchgässner, four issues are addressed: (1) the extent of double counting in attempts to reconcile estimates of the shadow economy based on the survey method and estimates based on the MIMIC (cum currency demand) approach, (2) advantages and disadvantages of the survey method, (3) of macro methods like the MIMIC approach and (4) the potential role of plausibility checks of estimates from the MIMIC approach with the survey method.