Volume 18, Issue 4

We conducted six treatments of a standard moral hazard experiment with hidden action. The behavior in all treatments and periods was inconsistent with established agency theory. In the early periods, behavior differed significantly between treatments. This difference largely vanished in the final periods. We used logit agent quantal response equilibrium (LAQRE) as a device to grasp boundedly rational behavior and found the following: (1) LAQRE predictions are much closer to subjects’ behavior in the laboratory; (2) LAQRE probabilities and experimental behavior show remarkably similar patterns; and (3) including social preferences in LAQRE does not better explain the experimental data; (4) LAQRE cannot explain the contract offers of some players who seem to choose some focal contract parameters.

This paper analyzes blindfolded vs. informed ultimatum bargaining where proposer and responder are both either uninformed or informed about the size of the pie. Considering the transition from one information setting to another suggests that more information induces lower (higher) price offers and acceptance thresholds when the pie is small (large). While our experimental data confirm this transition effect, risk aversion leads to diverging results in blindfolded ultimatum bargaining where task-independent strategies such as ‘equal sharing’ or the ‘golden mean’ are implemented more frequently.

We analyze the drivers of audience size and the number of questions asked in parallel sessions at the annual conference of the German Economics Association. We find that the location of the presentation is at least as important for the number of academics attending a talk as the combined effect of the person presenting and the paper presented. Being a presenter in a late morning session on the second day of a conference, close to the place where coffee is served, significantly increases the size of the audience. When it comes to asking questions, location becomes less important, but smaller rooms lead to more questions being asked. Younger researchers and very senior researchers attract more questions and comments. There are also interesting gender effects. Women attend research sessions more diligently than men, but seem to ask fewer questions than men. Men are less likely to attend presentations on health, education, welfare and development economics than women. Our findings suggest that strategic scheduling of sessions could ensure better participation at conferences. Moreover, different behaviors of men and women at conferences might also contribute to the lack of women in senior scientist positions.

The distinguishing feature of all Handelsblatt rankings published over the last ten years is that they could draw on premium quality bibliometric data. We present here the new method used by KOF and DICE to compile the 2017 Handelsblatt Rankings of university departments and individual economists. As in previous years, the rankings are based on quality weighted journal publications. We show that the benchmark results are robust to various changes in the employed method, in particular to changes in the convexity of the journal quality weighting scheme. In conclusion, we show how the collected data can be used to provide customized evaluations of entire academic careers of individual economists.

I provide a brief discussion of the Handelsblatt ranking by focusing on its journal quality weights. I summarize the methodology underlying journals’ prestige measure, which is derived from their citation networks, and discuss its strengths and shortcomings. Although I agree that Handelsblatt ranking provides a great service to the profession, that same profession needs to be rather careful not to overemphasize the journal quality weights.