Volume 13, Issue 3

In this article, we compare the distribution of price changes between collusive and non-collusive periods for 11 major cartels. Based on the theoretical and empirical results from previous research, we discuss the four moments with respect to price changes (mean, variance, skewness and kurtosis). However, none of the above descriptive statistics can be considered as a robust test allowing a differentiation between competition and cartel. Therefore, we implement the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. According to our results, 9 of 11 cartels were successful in controlling the market price for a number of years. The proposed methodology may be used for antitrust screening and regulatory purposes.

On the basis of transaction records of retail investors provided by a large financial institution, this article analyzes whether, in the aggregate, retail investors do copy insider trades. The results suggest that insider trades are indeed an important piece of information for the transactions of retail investors, whose buy-sell imbalances (BSIs) increase in stocks which insiders buy, and whose BSIs decrease following insider sales. These results are robust when considering stock characteristics and general attention effects. With regard to trading insider stocks, retail investors’ preferences for growth and attention are less pronounced when compared with trades of noninsider stocks.

Despite the increasing number of contributions to the literature, regional variations of the shadow economy have been hardly studied. This article analyses the determinants and derives the size of the shadow economy on the district level in Germany. I find that an inferior local labour market and the burden of taxation significantly contribute to the existence of the shadow economy, while a better enforcement of tax rules and regulations has the potential to deter such activities. Districts in the affluent south of Germany experience on average smaller shadow economies.

This study provides a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between capital income taxation and economic growth within an overlapping generations model when individuals may bequeath wealth. The altruistic concern is modeled as a synthesis of joy-of-giving and family altruism so that individuals may derive utility from the amount of bequest itself and by providing children with a disposable income later on in life. Using this framework, it is shown that, in contrast to the existing literature, increasing the capital income tax rate may well enhance growth under operative bequests.

The probability of providing informal care grows with one’s own age. While labor market effects due to caregiving are moderate, they could be concentrated in the years close to retirement. Therefore, I investigate whether care in the previous year leads to retirement in the year after by using German Socio-Economic Panel data from 2001 to 2009 and discrete-time hazard models. The effect of care on the retirement decision is indeed much higher than its effect on the labor or working hours of middleaged individuals. Women are affected to a larger extent but the retirement decision of men also reacts to their caregiving obligations.

In this article, we explore how characteristics of the domestic financial system influence the international allocation of consumption risk in a sample of OECD countries. Our results show that the extent of risk sharing achieved does not depend on the overall development of the domestic financial system per se. Rather, it depends on how the financial system is organized. Countries characterized by developed financial markets are less exposed to idiosyncratic risk, whereas the development of the banking sector contributes little to the international diversification of consumption risk.

This paper analyzes the effects of regulatory uncertainty regarding labor costs on investment in a liberalized market. We distinguish between the external investment margin (market entry) and the internal investment margin (technology), and establish that regulatory uncertainty affects these margins differently, encouraging market entry, but discouraging technological investment. As a consequence, the impact of regulatory uncertainty on competition in liberalized markets is a combination of these two countervailing forces.