Volume 13, Issue 2

It is well known that the analysis of efficient specialization in Ricardian production with many countries and many commodities cannot be broken down to the simple case of two countries and two commodities. By drawing on some recent results of convex geometry and the theory of cephoids, this paper characterizes efficient specialization in the general case.

A two-country model is developed to show how the optimality of a currency union depends on whether it brings an economic dividend in terms of potential growth and the Balassa-Samuelson (BS) effect (the steady appreciation of the real exchange rate due to cross-country differences in intersectoral productivity gaps). The model shows that such dividend needs to be larger, the higher the BS effect, the smaller the size of the economy, the larger the cross-country difference in the standard deviation of the supply shocks, the smaller their correlation and the larger the standard deviation of real exchange rate shocks. We calibrate the model to quantify such dividend as a function of plausible ranges of the parameter values. The results suggest that both the BS effect and the size of real exchange rate shocks play a key role in evaluating the optimality of accessing the currency union.

This paper emerges from the failure of the traditional models of hyperinflation with perfect foresight. Insights from two standard optimizing monetary settings and economic reasoning from case studies of extreme hyperinflation episodes provide relevant requirements for the specification of the demand for money during hyperinflation. The paper demonstrates that the possibility of perfect foresight monetary hyperinflation paths depends robustly on the essentiality of money. The essentiality of money provides some depth of explanation of the reasons why the popular semi-log schedule of the demand for money is not appropriate for analysing monetary hyperinflation with perfect foresight. The paper proposes a simple test of money essentiality for the appropriate specification of the demand-for-money equation in empirical studies of hyperinflation.

A procedure is suggested to decide whether or not to treat a consumer who violates the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference as ‘close enough’ to utility maximization. It is based on the reduction of the power the test has against random behaviour. It can also be used to compare different efficiency indices.

We analyse the impact of public subsidies on private sector research and development (R&D) activity for a sample of East German firms. Using propensity score matching, our empirical results indicate that subsidized firms indeed show a higher level of R&D intensity (R&D expenditures relative to total turnover) and a higher probability for patent application compared with non-subsidized firms. We find that, on average, the R&D intensity increases from 1.5% to 3.9%. The probability of patent application rises from 20% to 40%. These results closely match earlier empirical findings for East Germany. Given the fact that the East German innovation system is particularly driven by small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), we draw special attention to the effectiveness of R&D subsidies for this latter subgroup. Here, no specific empirical evidence is available so far. Our findings indicate that policy effectiveness also holds for private R&D activity of SMEs, with the highest increase in terms of R&D intensity being estimated for microbusinesses with up to ten employees.

This article presents a simple experiment on how laypeople form macroeconomic expectations. Subjects have to forecast inflation and gross domestic product growth. By varying the information provided in different treatments, we can assess the importance of historical time-series information vs. information acquired outside the experimental setting such as knowledge of expert forecasts. It turns out that the availability of historical data has a dominant impact on expectations and wipes out the influence of outside-lab information completely. Consequently, backward-looking behavior can be identified unambiguously as a decisive factor in expectation formation.

Financial intermediaries are, by definition, engaged in two-sided competition. Despite the well-known problems of achieving competitive solutions under twosided price competition, models of financial intermediation are commonly solved for competitive equilibria. This article provides a game-theoretic foundation for competitive equilibria in one of the most important models of financial intermediation, the seminal Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) adverse selection model of the credit market with a continuum of borrower types.

The strategy to maximize the long-term growth rate of final wealth (maximum expected log strategy, maximum geometric mean strategy, Kelly criterion) is based on probability theoretic underpinnings and has asymptotic optimality properties. This article reviews the allocation of wealth in a two-asset economy with one risky asset and a risk-free asset. It is also shown that the optimal fraction to be invested in the risky asset (i) depends on the length of the basic return period and (ii) is lower for heavy-tailed log returns than for light-tailed log returns.