Volume 9, Issue 4

Although empirical literature offers rich insights on the relationship of FDI and economic growth, it provides mixed evidence on the existence of productivity externalities in the host country generated by foreign multinational companies. A branch of literature suggests that the positive impact of FDI is conditional on countries stock of human capital or a threshold absorptive capacity. Most of the studies that came up with these conclusions are either based on developing or a mix of developing and developed country experiences. There is a dearth of literature explicitly focused on developed country experiences. Moreover, most literature has focused on the impact of inward FDI on host country economic growth. Does outward FDI exert any influence on source country economic growth? This paper addresses these issues using panel time series data from 25 OECD countries for the period 1980-2004 in a cross-country regression framework. It finds that both inward and outward are positively correlated with host and source country economic growth. However, the impact of FDI on economic growth is moderate. Results suggest that the elasticity of GDP growth with respect to both inward and outward FDI in the host and source countries is about 0.01.

This study attempts to determine three things: (1) whether structural changes or shifts exist in the outward foreign direct investment (FDI) data from OECD countries to eight Asian countries, (2) if a linkage exists across OECD FDI flow patterns, and (3) whether the determinants of FDI are consistently the same during the different periods as determined by structural breaks. In order to estimate the structural breaks, Bai and Perron's (1998, 2003) model is utilized because it allows for more than one break in the data. Because the time of the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis is of interest, the breaks are associated with this event. The results of the principal component analysis show that the signs of the explanatory variables differ from those previously found in the literature. The correlation coefficients between FDI and trade openness, the most significant explanatory variable in the study, are positive and significant for all countries and all periods with the exception of Thailand during the pre pre-crisis period. For most of the periods studied, some sort of Granger causality seemed to exist between FDI and trade openness, mostly in the form of feedback.

One of the most prominent features in the evolution of the European Union (EU) has been its geographical expansion. Using a dynamic general equilibrium approach, this paper predicts the effects of future eastward expansions of the EU on both inter- and intra-national flows of trade and labor. Underlying the simulations is a spatial model of the EU incorporating heterogeneous firms, intra-industry trade, iceberg trade costs, and many possible locations. Locations are populated by a large number of potential firms, and these firms employ labor that varies across countries in its relative skill. The dynamics of the model are such that unprofitable firms are forced to exit in the long run, and workers have the opportunity to migrate in response to steep gradients in real compensation. Novel features of the data used here are that locations are defined in a very precise way and that the simulations take as their starting point a proxy for the actual distribution of economic activity across the European landmass. The model is calibrated to match aggregate trade and migration data from the 2004 enlargement as well as data on exporter characteristics. Simulations of enlargement predict an increase in aggregate exports of potential new members to the previous EU-15 of 4.7 percent of GDP in the five-year period following adoption of the acquis communautaire and net migration flows from potential new members to the previous EU-15 of 1.3 percent of aggregate acceding country population over the same period. Moreover, the simulations deliver many of the stylized facts of economic geography.

Using quarterly data from 1973 to 2008, we provide evidence that current account (CA) deficits exceeding 4.2% of GDP (“Mann's rule") do have a significant lowering effect on the U.S. dollar value against major currencies. Controlling for inflation, public debt, and a broad trade weighted index, excessive CA deficits have a negative long-run impact on the USD. Along the transition path, much faster speeds of adjustment to long-run equilibrium are found when current account deficits in excess of Mann's rule are considered: 20% of the deviations from the long-run equilibrium are corrected in a month against 8% or 9% without Mann's rule. This suggests that excessive values of the CA deficit are “priced in" in international foreign exchange markets. Contrary to earlier evidence in favor of CA sustainability, we conjecture that economic conditions have made investors more sensitive to bad news for the U.S. dollar.

Over the past decade emerging markets accumulated foreign currency reserves to insure against the risks of global financial integration. They were wise to do so. Countries with large reserves have fared better in the crisis of 2008/09. Yet collectively reserve accumulation had unintended consequences. It has contributed to the build-up of global imbalances and financial distortions that helped create the macroeconomic backdrop for the crisis. This article looks at recent patterns of global capital flows from the perspective of economic history, trying to set events in a longer term perspective. It argues that the crisis could mark the end of the latest attempt to manage the financial stability risks of capital market integration. Emerging markets will not consent to facing global financial flows without large foreign currency reserves, but a return to currency interventions and reserve accumulation would be equally problematic. Historically, the ups and downs of global capital market integration have been driven by varying assessments of the benefits of capital mobility. With the recent crisis the time for such a reassessment might have come.

The current economic crisis has long-term causes that are rooted in the economic dynamics of globalization. I argue that globalization (a) increases the world economic growth rate; (b) is consistent with development, underdevelopment and miracle growth; (c) increases inequality in leading countries; and (d) generates a transition path along which the interest rate diminishes if capital accumulates at a faster rate than technological change. This condition is generated by cheap-factor-seeking foreign direct investment (FDI), which by combining advanced technologies with low costs yields extraordinary profits and experiences lower incentives for innovation. Over the period 1980-2007, liberalization unleashed a wave of globalization, and the international sector experienced miracle growth. Profits rose to all time highs and global saving exceeded global investment. This savings glut or investment shortfall fueled a global housing appreciation, after which excessive risk in a deregulated financial market led to a financial meltdown. While restoring financial markets and reducing the housing market fallout have been immediate priorities for the U.S., economic growth can only be recovered by restoring global investment. Lowering interest rates cannot generate very much investment, nor will consumption flows from fiscal spending. To stimulate the global economy, whole new economic sectors and technologies must be developed in advanced countries, and economic development deepened in underdeveloped countries. At the same time, a global harmonization of corporate taxes, ending the corporate tax haven loophole, would raise funds for publicly provided goods that complement private investment and balance incentives between local and international production. It would also reduce the polarization between developed and underdeveloped countries, balance global markets with global governance, and strengthen global cooperation.

This study attempts to examine the effects of real bilateral exchange rates on Malaysia's bilateral trade balances with its three major trading partners: the USA, Japan, and Singapore. The results suggest that the bilateral trade balance, real exchange rate, domestic and foreign incomes are cointegrated. In the long-run, Malaysia's bilateral trade balances are found to be responsive to the changes of bilateral exchange rate in the cases of the USA and Singapore but irresponsive for Japan. There is a clear evidence of the J-curve effect only in the case of Malaysia's trade balance with the United States. The results also indicate that devaluation tends to be recessionary. The findings suggest that Malaysia could use undervalued exchange rate strategy to improve its trade balances with the United States and Singapore but not Japan.

The success of Chile's economy in the past decades is relevant to the efforts of other emerging countries to achieve rapid economic growth. One of Chile's main accomplishments has been a steady increase in exports. The increase was in physical volume of exports, not in unit value. This increase was the result of a correct strategy of opening the economy, which permitted the more competitive Chilean businesses to access external markets. This strategy may be reaching a point of diminishing returns, so the dilemma that Chile now faces is relevant to other emerging countries as they try to grow their economies rapidly. To achieve significant further growth in the long run, Chile needs to move into new kinds of business opportunities, in categories and areas where it has not established a foothold. To break into these new areas, Chile has to develop new capabilities and new strategies. The old way of growing the economy is running into constraints.The data is about Chile's wood products export industry, which is the country's most successful in terms of adding value as measured by macro metrics. That export industry is not as well known as Chile's wine and fresh fruit export industries but has a more impressive record. The firms in Chile's wood export industry, despite being successful in increasing the dollar value of products exported, have not been able to make themselves competitive in stages of wood production beyond basic and repetitive processes. Other emerging countries are facing the same challenge.Chilean wood products exporting firms in Chile have been slow to respond to signals from the market. They have not been able to achieve high standards of quality or precision, and they have worked only with local raw materials. These firms have attempted to export manufactured products, but these attempts have failed. For those reasons many observers argue that the advantage in the market that these firms enjoy is due to superior endowments of natural resources rather than to corporate strategies.High raw material prices have not triggered a new chapter in this history. On the contrary, this comfortable situation has lulled the country into complacency. Other countries were in the same comfortable situation and now the financial crisis has intervened. Chile's present slow growth is discouraging but might prod the country to achieve greater sophistication in exporting goods and services.