Volume 4, Issue 1

Policy-makers always say they want the best intelligence, but in fact they do not because good intelligence often raises doubts and challenges policy. They also always claim to be working to improve intelligence, but in fact do not understand the problems, and many "reforms," such as the recent establishment of a Director of National Intelligence, are useless if not harmful.

'Dual use' refers to those technologies that can, with some adaptation, have both military and civilian applications. It is a concept rooted in the dichotomies of the Cold War. Over the last 55 years it has served both to structure an export control regime aimed at limiting the diffusion of advanced technology to hostile states and to underpin a range of domestic defense acquisition policies aimed at increasing the utilization of civilian technologies by the military. With the end of the Cold War and the erosion of the boundaries between civil and military technologies, U.S. policy to control the spread of military-related technology is in disarray. A more workable policy would replace open-ended support for new military technology with a realistic assessment of the security risks and needs, and limit export controls to a few, highly dangerous technologies.

As a closed labor force, with limited lateral entry, the military must build officers from within. This means that when significant changes in operating environments occur—such as the end of the Cold War or the aftermath of 9/11—changes in the military personnel system can take significant time to affect the composition of the officer corps. Changes at the end of the Cold War in the Army officer development system created greater specialization of officers in their specific career fields, which is both understandable and supportable when viewed in historical context. As the nation addresses the officer development system today, the Army should consider returning to some practices implemented during the Cold War to enhance flexibility and versatility among its officer corps in the post-9/11 environment.

The United States does not have a clearly defined national security strategy for the 21st century. This problem has its roots in a failure, which precedes 9/11, to come to grips with the fundamentally different nature of the global strategic environment. Stating that we are “at war with terrorism” may be correct at some levels, but it fails to identify an underlying strategic imperative around which we can build a comprehensive organizing framework to protect and promote our security both at home and abroad. Terrorism and other critical threats emerge from a failure and weakness of legitimate governance. A grand strategy focused on the promotion of legitimate governance and the expansion of the global community of legitimately governed states would provide the organizing framework for managing national security.

International Relations (IR) “Realists” John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt have entered the realm of identity politics. Their maiden voyage inside the “black box” of the state, a recent paper entitled “The Israel Lobby,” is likely their most famous but least credible work. In apportioning blame for the US invasion of Iraq, they dismiss any influence of energy dependence or geopolitical interests, while attributing causal responsibility to an expansively defined “Israel Lobby,” claims as specious as they are ethnically charged. Where their critique of US and Israeli policies is right, it suggests that key parts of their theories of international politics are wrong. In ivory tower IR, “The Israel Lobby” represents a theoretical transgression on the part of orthodox “Realists.” In real-world politics, Mearsheimer and Walt’s essay presents d/Democratic opponents of the US invasion of Iraq and the Israeli occupation of the West Bank with the opportunity to distinguish principled protest from scapegoating.

This article provides a detailed empirical and analytic critique of the Mearsheimer and Walt article. It examines the claim that U.S. Middle East policy is at variance with U.S. national interest and tries to understand how that claim jibes with the principles of the Realist School of international relations theory to which the authors belong. It then examines the explanation offered for this misguided policy, the political strength of the Israel Lobby. It looks at their account of the structure and dynamics of the Israel Lobby. Then it evaluates how well that account fits the realities of modern interest group composition and behavior, and the degree to which that account provides an adequate explanation of U.S. Middle East policy.

The current problems facing President Bush are not solely of his own making. Over the past several decades, the office of the presidency has lost much of the stature and respect it once commanded, due to the actions of the men who have occupied it, more critical and even contemptuous coverage by the news media, and modern politicians’ obsession with public opinion polls. These developments do not bode well for the long-term health of the American republic.

This paper examines criteria the public use when evaluating a president’s action in foreign policy. It attempts to discern who has the upper hand in shaping public opinion on foreign policy choices pursued by the president: policymaking elites in Congress or the media? Previous studies have shown that media cues are generally inconsequential in determining public support for presidential actions in a foreign policy crisis, particular when placed in a Cold War framework. Even without the Cold War framework, however, the media appears largely irrelevant in determining public interpretation of presidential actions during a crisis. This finding supports prior understandings of a rational public not susceptible to media slant, but also suggests that the president, with Congressional support, has considerable leeway to provide frames of evaluation, and control basic facts early in the crisis to win public support. The implications for democratic accountability are discussed.