Band 19, Heft 2

Hillary Clinton won the national popular vote for president in 2016, but lost to Donald Trump in the Electoral College. Trump’s margin of victory in several decisive battleground states was smaller than the combined vote for the two leading minor party candidates: Gary Johnson, of the Libertarian Party, and Jill Stein, of the Green Party. The perception that Johnson and Stein “stole” the 2016 presidential election from Clinton is widespread, and potentially consequential for future minor party candidacies, but it has not yet been rigorously tested. In this article, we extend the analysis of minor party voting in the 1992 election from Lacy, D., and B. C. Burden. 1999. “The Vote-Stealing and Turnout Effects of Ross Perot in the 1992 U.S. Presidential Election.” American Journal of Political Science 43 (1): 233–55, by using data from the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study to estimate a multinomial probit model of voting behavior—including outcomes for vote choice and abstention—and calculate the predicted probabilities that Johnson and Stein voters would have voted for another candidate or abstained from voting, had one or both of these candidates been excluded from the ballot. We then reallocate Johnson’s and Stein’s votes accordingly, to estimate Clinton’s and Trump’s counterfactual vote shares nationally and within key battleground states. Our analysis indicates that Johnson and Stein did not deprive Clinton of an Electoral College majority, nor Trump the legitimacy of winning the national popular vote. We estimate that most Johnson and Stein voters would have abstained from voting if denied the choice to vote for their preferred candidate, and that most of Johnson’s remaining voters would have supported Trump.

While much attention has been paid to understanding the drivers of support for Donald Trump, less focus has been placed on understanding the factors that led individuals to turn out and vote or stay home. This paper compares non-voters and voters in the 2016 election and explores how self-reported candidate preference prior to the election predicted turnout across three different state contexts: (1) all states, (2) closely contested states won by Trump, and (3) closely contested states won by Clinton. We find that preference for both candidates predicted turnout in the aggregate (all states) and in closely contested states won by Clinton, but only preference for Trump predicted turnout in the closely contested states won by Trump. Moreover, we find that political interest is negatively associated with preference for Clinton when examining candidate preferences among non-voters. Our analysis suggests that non-voters in the 2016 election held meaningful candidate preferences that impacted voter turnout but that state context played an important role in this relationship. This study sheds light on an understudied component of the 2016 election, the attitudes and behavior of non-voters, as well as points to the importance of incorporating contextual variation in future work on electoral behavior and voter turnout.

How do Super PACs allocate their resources? The question is both timely and relevant, particularly as we reflect on the ten-year anniversary of the Citizens United ruling. Super PACs now outspend – sometimes by huge margins, as in the 2016 presidential election – all other groups’ independent expenditures including those of parties, unions, and 501(c) organizations. The issue is especially important in congressional politics, where Super PACs have an opportunity to shape the institution every two years through congressional elections. Utilizing outside spending data from the Center for Responsive Politics, we analyze four U.S. House election cycles since the Supreme Court’s landmark 2010 Citizens United ruling (2012–2018). The likelihood that Super PACs invest in a race is strongly determined by the electoral context, even after controlling for the legislative influence of the incumbent member of Congress.

It has often been stated that in the United States the left tends to be less united than the right on issues related to identity politics such as race, gender, and religion. This article presents evidence that this asymmetry in partisan alignment over identity politics is changing over time. Looking at various measures of public opinion shows that the left’s agreement on issues related to identity politics has either caught up with the right or that the gap is diminishing. The article considers various possible explanations for unity on these issues – including personality distribution, party homogeneity, and message infrastructure – and shows that partisan spillover in the context of polarization helps explains the closing of the gap in unity between the right and the left. In an era of polarization, Democratic affiliation induces warmer feeling toward stigmatized coalition partners. Groups that may have joined the Democratic party on a single group interest claim (race, gender, religion, class) will gradually move toward greater acceptance of other group interest claims supported by the party. These findings have implications for the oft-stated strategic claim that the left needs to focus on class redistribution over identity politics if the left does not want to be fractured.

During his presidency, Barack Obama described rising economic inequality as “the defining challenge of our time.” But a growing number of scholars and journalists argue that rising inequality is in part a result of the Democratic Party’s diminishing fidelity to an egalitarian economic agenda and its embrace of neoliberalism. In this article, we assess the veracity of this claim through a content analysis of all national Democratic Party platforms issued since 1984. We find that broad assertions of Democratic retreat from economic equality are for the most part exaggerated. Specifically, we argue that Democrats’ support for egalitarian policies has been complex and varied over time, with a marked decline under the influence of the New Democrats in the 1990s followed by a significant resurgence thereafter. However, while party support for equalizing policies has rebounded overall, the extent of the party’s commitment to specific policies varies according to the purported deservingness of beneficiaries. Our findings have important implications for debates concerning Democratic Party change, the politics of inequality, and the policy agenda of the Joe Biden administration.

The study of voter competence has made significant contributions to our understanding of politics, but at this point there are diminishing returns to the endeavor. Voter competence is unlikely to improve dramatically enough to make much of a difference to our politics. By contrast, the competence of officials can and does vary substantially over short periods of time. To understand variations in government performance, therefore, we would do better to focus on the abilities and performance of officials, not ordinary citizens. We elaborate on this argument, emphasizing the “incompetence multiplier”: the way that the properties of hierarchies can amplify the incompetence of those in powerful positions. We illustrate our argument with an extended discussion of the U.S. response to the COVID-19 pandemic.