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Allocating Unlimited Money: What Explains Super PAC Spending in Congressional Elections?

  • Michael S. Rocca

    Michael S. Rocca is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of New Mexico. Professor Rocca’s subfield is American politics and his primary research and teaching interests relate to American national institutions, particularly the US Congress, as well as campaign spending U.S. elections.

     EMAIL logo     und Jared W. Clay

    Jared W. Clay is a research scientist at the Institute for Social Research at the University of New Mexico. He received his Ph.D. from the Department of Political Science at the University of New Mexico and specializes in American politics. His dissertation examines the demographic and political consequences of the Twentieth Century’s “Great Agricultural Transition” in rural America.
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 7. September 2021
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Abstract

How do Super PACs allocate their resources? The question is both timely and relevant, particularly as we reflect on the ten-year anniversary of the Citizens United ruling. Super PACs now outspend – sometimes by huge margins, as in the 2016 presidential election – all other groups’ independent expenditures including those of parties, unions, and 501(c) organizations. The issue is especially important in congressional politics, where Super PACs have an opportunity to shape the institution every two years through congressional elections. Utilizing outside spending data from the Center for Responsive Politics, we analyze four U.S. House election cycles since the Supreme Court’s landmark 2010 Citizens United ruling (2012–2018). The likelihood that Super PACs invest in a race is strongly determined by the electoral context, even after controlling for the legislative influence of the incumbent member of Congress.

Keywords: Super PACs; U.S. congressional elections; campaign finance; Citizens United ; interest groups
Corresponding author: Michael S. Rocca, Department of Political Science, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico, E-mail:

About the authors

Michael S. Rocca

Michael S. Rocca is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of New Mexico. Professor Rocca’s subfield is American politics and his primary research and teaching interests relate to American national institutions, particularly the US Congress, as well as campaign spending U.S. elections.

Jared W. Clay

Jared W. Clay is a research scientist at the Institute for Social Research at the University of New Mexico. He received his Ph.D. from the Department of Political Science at the University of New Mexico and specializes in American politics. His dissertation examines the demographic and political consequences of the Twentieth Century’s “Great Agricultural Transition” in rural America.

Appendix: Regression Results for General Election Only

Variables Total spending On behalf of incums On behalf of challs Repub/Cons Dem/Lib Business Single-issue Union
Power variables
 Committee leader −0.066 −0.028 −0.043 −0.072 −0.024 −0.015 0.025 0.068
(0.056) (0.054) (0.051) (0.051) (0.047) (0.030) (0.047) (0.038)
 Control committee −0.208** −0.133* −0.081 −0.089 −0.066 −0.000 −0.122* 0.011
(0.058) (0.056) (0.053) (0.053) (0.049) (0.032) (0.048) (0.040)
 Tenure (sqrt) 0.026 −0.023 0.025 −0.026 −0.024 −0.020 −0.033 −0.046*
(0.033) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.029) (0.019) (0.028) (0.023)
 Party leader −0.023 −0.117 0.039 0.113 −0.030 −0.089 −0.167 −0.094
(0.168) (0.163) (0.154) (0.153) (0.143) (0.092) (0.140) (0.115)
Ideological & party variables
 Democrat 0.311** 0.278** 0.334** 0.085 0.252** 0.108 0.239** 0.233*
(0.107) (0.103) (0.097) (0.097) (0.090) (0.058) (0.089) (0.073)
 Ideological extremity −0.962** −0.878** −1.06** −0.765** −0.680** −0.434** −0.887** −0.162
(0.221) (0.214) (0.202) (0.200) (0.187) (0.120) (0.184) (0.151)
Electoral context variables
 Challenger spending (logged) 0.046** 0.032** 0.058** 0.035** 0.047** 0.006* 0.032** 0.017*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
 Previous vote share −0.012** −0.008** −0.014** −0.010** −0.011** −0.004* −0.007** −0.004*
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Presidential vote margin −0.004 −0.003 −0.001 −0.002 −0.003 0.001 −0.004* −0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Midterm election 0.182** 0.190** 0.094* 0.090* 0.155** −0.041 0.058 0.207**
(0.052) (0.050) (0.047) (0.047) (0.044) (0.028) (0.043) (0.035)
Constant 1.79** 1.47** 1.34** 1.30* 1.04 0.529** 1.23** 0.377**
(0.196) (0.191) (0.180) (0.178) (0.166) (0.107) (0.164) (0.134)
n 1518 1518 1518 1518 1518 1518 1518 1518
Adjusted R 2 0.18 0.13 0.22 0.15 0.20 0.03 0.16 0.06

  1. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01, two-tailed. Models include all races that featured one incumbent. The dependent variable is the log of Super PAC spending in the general election only. Standard errors are in parentheses.

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Published Online: 2021-09-07

© 2021 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

Artikel in diesem Heft

  1. Frontmatter
  2. Introduction: Volume 19 No. 2
  3. Did Gary Johnson and Jill Stein Cost Hillary Clinton the Presidency? A Counterfactual Analysis of Minor Party Voting in the 2016 US Presidential Election
  4. Candidate Preference, State Context, and Voter Turnout: Comparing Non-Voters and Voters in the 2016 Presidential Election
  5. Allocating Unlimited Money: What Explains Super PAC Spending in Congressional Elections?
  6. Divided by Identity on the Left? Partisan Spillover and Identity Politics Alignment
  7. Retreating from Redistribution? Trends in Democratic Party Fidelity to Economic Equality, 1984–2020
  8. Lethal Incompetence: Leaders, Organizations, and the U.S. Response to COVID-19
  9. Book Reviews
  10. LaFleur Stephens-Dougan: Race to the Bottom: How Racial Appeals Work in American Politics
  11. Rachel M. Blum: How the Tea Party Captured the GOP
https://doi.org/10.1515/for-2021-0016
Schlagwörter für diesen Artikel
Super PACs; U.S. congressional elections; campaign finance; Citizens United; interest groups

Artikel in diesem Heft

  1. Frontmatter
  2. Introduction: Volume 19 No. 2
  3. Did Gary Johnson and Jill Stein Cost Hillary Clinton the Presidency? A Counterfactual Analysis of Minor Party Voting in the 2016 US Presidential Election
  4. Candidate Preference, State Context, and Voter Turnout: Comparing Non-Voters and Voters in the 2016 Presidential Election
  5. Allocating Unlimited Money: What Explains Super PAC Spending in Congressional Elections?
  6. Divided by Identity on the Left? Partisan Spillover and Identity Politics Alignment
  7. Retreating from Redistribution? Trends in Democratic Party Fidelity to Economic Equality, 1984–2020
  8. Lethal Incompetence: Leaders, Organizations, and the U.S. Response to COVID-19
  9. Book Reviews
  10. LaFleur Stephens-Dougan: Race to the Bottom: How Racial Appeals Work in American Politics
  11. Rachel M. Blum: How the Tea Party Captured the GOP
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