Band 19, Heft 1

Some scholars have judged the Trump presidency to be an ineffective failure by applying theories of presidential power derived from the research of Richard Neustadt, who emphasized the need for presidents to master the task of bargaining with other stakeholders in the American political system to overcome what he saw as the limited potency of unilateral action. Such an approach, however, fails to account for two important considerations: (1) whether Trump’s goals in office were similar to those of other presidents, and (2) whether the Trump presidency was instead organized around the principles of unitary executive theory, an increasingly popular conception of the presidency in conservative intellectual circles. Viewing the Trump presidency through this alternative lens emphasizes its successes in gaining political control over elements of the executive branch bureaucracy and resisting institutional checks by Congress, raising serious questions about whether Trump was indeed often effective in realizing his goals—and whether future presidents will follow in the same path.

Early assessments of Trump’s White House portrayed an organization riven by personality disputes and administrative chaos. But in many ways, Trump’s White House staff descriptively bears a strong resemblance to its predecessors, as we demonstrate by drawing on more than 50 years of data on presidential staff composition. In terms of size, structure, and the distributions of functions, the Trump White House represents not a break with the past so much as its continuation. Trump’s staffing patterns departed from precedent more in the areas of staff turnover and recruitment; however, it is not clear just how significant those changes are.

Growing levels of polarization and out-group hostility have become fashionable explanations for the caustic politics of the Trump presidency. However, partisan and ideological identities cannot explain popular attraction to Trump’s anti-elite and populist rhetoric, nor can polarization and sorting account for rising levels of mass identification as political independents. In light of these discrepancies, we offer an explanation for the Trump era unrelated to traditional left-right identities and ideologies: anti-establishment orientations. We argue that much of what is interpreted as an expression of partisan and ideological extremism or polarization is actually the product of a deep-seated antagonism toward the broader political establishment. We first exhibit the individual-level correlates of anti-establishment orientations, finding that people holding strong anti-establishment views exhibit relatively high levels of anti-social personality traits and distrust of others. We then show that anti-establishment orientations are more predictive than left-right orientations of beliefs in conspiracy theories regarding COVID-19, QAnon, and voter fraud. Most importantly, we demonstrate that, while anti-establishment orientations are positively related to support for Donald Trump, they are negatively related to support for Joe Biden and both major parties. In short, the toxicity emblematic of the Trump era—support for outsider candidates, belief in conspiracy theories, corrosive rhetoric, and violence—are derivative of antipathy towards the established political order, rather than a strict adherence to partisan and ideological dogma. We conclude that Trump’s most powerful and unique impact on American electoral politics is his activation, inflammation, and manipulation of preexisting anti-establishment orientations for partisan ends.

Talk of fraud dominated President Donald J. Trump’s campaign and time in office. In this article, we explore whether members of Congress followed Trump’s lead in discussing all types of fraud, including electoral fraud as well as fraud, waste, and abuse. Using a unique dataset of the universe of congressional electronic newsletters from 2010 to 2021, we show that Republicans wrote to constituents about fraud much more than Democrats, especially about electoral fraud after Trump’s election, but it was Democrats who used angrier rhetoric to discuss fraud, a check on the President and many of the false claims about voter fraud in 2016 and 2020. These findings show an important aspect of the inter-party and inter-branch dynamics at play during Trump’s presidency; once keen to focus on fraud, waste and abuse in government congressional Republican attention shifted once the head of the executive branch was a co-partisan to parroting the claims of electoral and voter fraud made by the President.

From the moment that he first announced his presidential candidacy until his final days in office, Donald Trump’s signature personal political cause was the restriction of immigration. Media coverage and public debate often focused on Trump’s rhetorical invocation of this issue and emphasized his opposition to undocumented immigration in particular, as symbolized by his famous proposal to build a wall across the southern border of the United States. But while the wall itself was not completed, the Trump administration worked aggressively through the federal bureaucracy to reduce all forms of immigration. The Trump administration’s record on immigration should therefore be understood as extending far beyond charged presidential rhetoric and sporadic wall-building efforts, leaving a much more consequential substantive legacy in American immigration policy that will not be quickly or easily reversed by future presidents.

This article reviews the causes, contours and potential consequences of President Donald J. Trump’s 234 appointments to the federal judiciary. The causes will be familiar to political scientists who are fond of reminding people that “elections have consequences” and that the “Supreme Court [and by extension entire federal judiciary] follows the election returns.” The contours of the Trump Judiciary are congruent with Trump’s campaign promise to appoint judges “in the mold of Justice Scalia,” the conservative legal icon who died suddenly in February 2016. We show how Trump and Senate majority leader Mitch McConnell made good on this promise with the help of the Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies, appointing ideologically conservative, young, and mostly male and white judges to lifetime appointments on the federal bench. In laying out the potential consequences of Trump’s remaking of the federal judiciary, we outline three areas where these judges are likely to make an impact on law and politics in the coming decades: rolling back liberal and progressive victories in the culture wars, likely in more subtle ways that align with Alison Gash’s concept of “below-the-radar” legal change; extending the federal deregulation campaign that began in earnest with the Reagan Administration; and issuing rulings in the areas of voting rights, campaign finance, and redistricting that tip the scales of democracy in favor of Republican electoral outcomes.

What did Trump’s four years do to our mass politics? Partisanism—a blind, often unyielding loyalty to one’s own party—has come to define much of our political discourse, very much to the detriment of the American polity. Both the literature and the data on party evaluations confirm that people are behaving in ways that display not just consistent polarization but a deeper level of partisan bias, despite their lack of ideological consistency. Political science should respond to these developments with increased focus on the negative aspects of partisanship that can lead to this form of partisanism so dangerously exhibited in the Capitol riot, among other events, as well as a thoughtful classroom critique of these habits.