Volume 44, Issue 2

Aristotle’s use of the term ‘ eironeia ’ in the Nicomachean Ethics ( NE ) appears to be inconsistent: first, he attributes the attitude termed ‘ eironeia ’ to the great-souled man ( megalopsychos ), who is defined by his virtuousness, then he classifies ‘ eironeia ’ as one of the two vices which are central to his account of the virtue of truthfulness. Modern attempts to explain and to solve the “riddle of the great-souled eiron ” have not been satisfying. This paper argues that the riddle results from Aristotle trying to reconcile aristocratic values with democratic reality. In the process, some insight will be gained on the concept of the megalopsychos in general, on Aristotle’s notion of the virtue of truthfulness and on his depiction of Socrates. Finally, it is argued that Aristotle’s use of the notion of ‘ eironeia ’ in the NE bears some resemblance to the use of the notion of ‘irony’ in modern political theory.

This study intends to show that the usually given meaning of the teleological dualism τὸ οὗ/τὸ ᾧ of Aristotle’s De anima , understood as “an aim or goal” and “the beneficiary”, does not come from Aristotle, but from a controversial interpretation of the ancient commentators. It originates on the attempt of certain Peripatetics to appropriate the Stoic distinction between “happiness” and “the happy subject” designated as the σκοπός and the τέλος of moral action. After this historical accuracy, we will propose a different reading of the Aristotelian distinction according to the context of De anima as designating the tendency in the individual towards its preservation and use.

Against the Epicureans who conceive the gods as indifferent to make them inaccessible to anger, the Stoics assert that the god is incapable of anger due to his very benevolence. However, doesn’t the Stoic god’s concern for man threaten his impassivity and expose him to feel anger and passions? In this paper, I address, in a theological context, the classic ethical problem of the compatibility between the integrity of the individual and his concern for others. Several hypotheses are examined. Is divine benevolence merely a disposition to do good to human beings, devoid of any affection for them? If it is a feeling, is it an aspiration to the very exercise of the virtue of benevolence, rather than to the good of mankind in itself? Or could it be understood, in the context of the cosmic οἰκείωσις, as the god’s care for his own parts? Finally, should not we distinguish, in god’s philanthropy, between the φιλία he feels for the wise men and the ἔρως he feels for everyone else?

According to the prevalent scholarly opinion, Eudorus of Alexandria supposes two interrelated levels within the same metaphysical hierarchy: one transcendent principle ( to hen ) at the highest level and two opposing principles ( monas and aoristos dyas ) at the subjacent level. This paper presents an alternative interpretation, arguing that Eudorus’ report, in fact, involves two different explanations regarding the first principle(s): one strictly monistic and the other dualistic. Eudorus holds the former approach (the so-called highest teaching, which is particularly influenced by Platonic henotheism) to represent the pinnacle of Pythagorean metaphysics according to which the latter, secondary teaching ought to be construed. In the final analysis, interpreting dualism through the lens of henology results in a somewhat idiosyncratic yet Pythagoreanising account of a Monad and Dyad that are, if understood as principle, identical to the One.

Galen’s elemental mixture of fire, air, water and earth (and of the corresponding primary qualities, hot, cold, dry and wet) is primarily a physical process, in which primary elements mix and give rise to all compounded physical bodies, inanimate and animate. As such, the concrete, physical process of mixture is an essential basis for a thorough understanding of Galen’s physical system. In this article I pursued a twofold aim. First, I showed Galen’s syncretic approach while expounding his theory of mixture (insofar as he attributes that theory equally to ‘Hippocrates’, Aristotle and the Stoics) and illustrated the reasons behind this approach. Second, and more importantly, I addressed Galen’s epistemological position concerning mixture’s constituents and answered the question of whether, according to Galen, are the qualities alone, conceived more Aristotelico as conceptually distinct from the body itself, to mix or if Galen viewed mixture, as the Stoics did, as a coextension of bodies. As we argue, Galen assigns the epistemological status of πιθανόν to the Aristotelian and Peripatetic doctrines. This indicates that, to a certain extent, he joins this historical debate and is more closely aligned with Aristotle and the Peripatetics than with the Stoics. By resorting to what is πιθανόν Galen obtains two results: (1) does not expose himself to accusations of dogmatism but, at the same time and in his method, enters the ongoing controversy about qualities and bodies without taking a definitive position, and (2) he preserves his syncretic theoretical structure which finds its linchpin in the defence of a medical-cum-philosophical continuism.

The idea that the soul has a guardian daemon was a common topic among Platonists, informed by different readings of Plato, especially Symp . 202e and Resp . 620e. In his philosophically dense interpretation, Plotinus describes the daemon as the ‘pole of attraction’ or the erotic disposition that keeps the core of one’s personality directed towards the Good. In this way, the daemon promotes the soul’s ascent to higher levels of reality through a transition from unconsciousness into consciousness that, across different incarnations, will eventually flow into the disembodied self. In order to unpack this view, this article brings together Enn . III.4 and III.5 with Enn . VI.7, where Plotinus discusses the difference between soul (ψυχή) and the expressed principle (λόγος) belonging to soul. This difference if fundamental to fully understand the role of the guardian daemon in the soul’s πρόοδος and ἐπιστροφή.

Simplicius’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories contains the most extended testimony about the Stoic conception of acting (ποιεῖν) and undergoing (πάσχειν). Simplicius ascribed to the Stoics the idea that acting and undergoing are to be reduced to the movement. To this opinion Simplicius opposed the Aristotelian view according to which acting and undergoing are two different categories. In this paper I intend to outline the original Stoic position comparing the reportage of Simplicius with other Stoic sources. Later, I will deal with Boethus’ defense of the distinction between the categories of acting and undergoing. I will argue that Boethus directly reacted against the Stoic opinion reformulating it in Aristotelian language.