Volume 43, Issue 2

The author deals with the lost works of Empedocles, an often neglected subject, in the frame of the discussion concerning the number of the poems and their main features. He reviews the traces of the Passage of Xerxes , of the Medical Discourse , and of the Proem to Apollo among the fragments and witnesses, taking his cue from textual aspects and dealing with the contents, the significance of each of these writings in Empedocles’ culture and thought and their multifarious relationships with his times. As to the Passage , he tries to reconcile the contrasting interpretations so far proposed (historical or religious poem). Concerning B111, the only relic from the Medical Discourse , he explains why its contents are incompatible with the Physical Poem and the Purifications . He analyzes the Proem to Apollo in several perspectives (text, witnesses, contents also from the epistemological point of view, literary genre). He assigns fragments 131–134 and 142 to the Proem , drawing one of his arguments from the comparison with the third Homeric Hymn to Apollo , and also suggesting a relationship with an intellectual cult of the sun. Formal features help to ascribe each fragment to the relevant poem. Close similarities between fragments do not necessarily mean that they come from the same writing: Empedocles is wont to allude to one poem of his while composing another. The author concludes that the striving for a reductio ad unum of the Acragantine’s output, also evident in the attempt by a number of scholars to make only one poem out of the Περὶ φύσεως and the Καθαρμοί, has often led researchers to take for granted that none of the fragments preserved might belong to the lost works.

This paper argues that the Encomium of Helen must be seen as a speech about the value and importance of wisdom in human life and not as much as one as about logos . Gorgias sustains his vision based on a certain intellectualism which reduces moral faults to intellectual errors. This intellectualist program comprises a rationalization of emotions and a commitment with a certain tradition that discriminates between a minority with knowledge and a majority with only opinion. The consequence for Helen is that she can be excused from her action at the expense of being reproached for her lack of wisdom and is thus relegated to the ignorant majority. Therefore, what is initially praise and an apology turns into severe blame. For this, I argue, the encomium can be qualified as an amusement ( paignion ). For the Encomium ’s listeners the amusement becomes a challenge that demands they decipher the speech’s paradoxical character and appeal to their own wisdom to not be reproached like Helen. Thus the Encomium cannot be seen as a treaty nor as mere joke but rather as an intellectual agôn between the speech and the listener, which serves them “to arm the soul for contests of excellence”, as the epigram dedicated to Gorgias in Delfos says.

Cicero’s Timaeus legitimately stands as the first Latin exegesis of the Platonic dialogue. I shall deal with the interpretation of §§19–21, a passage that departs significantly from the Greek text in several respects. The aim of this paper is to explore the role Aristotelianism might have played in Cicero’s Timaeus . Among the points that support such an analysis is the mention of the Peripatetic Cratippus in the prologue. The interpretative scenario I suggest considers both Cratippus’ role and Antiochus’s philosophical system with its agreement between Platonism and Aristotelianism.

This paper aims to investigate the equivalent of Epicurus’ πρόληψις, the second criterion of the Epicurean Canonic (DL X 31 = fr. 35 Usener), in Lucretius’ De rerum natura ( DRN ). Taking stock of the several occurrences of the Latin terms notitia and notities in the six books of the poem, I show that Lucretius’ view about preconception remains faithful to Epicurus’ πρόληψις, and that the poet does not endorse a less empiricist position than his Master because of some influence of the Stoic ἔννοια. To this end, I will also briefly address an important case in which πρόληψις, albeit not clearly mentioned, plays an essential role, namely the prolepsis of the deity ( DRN V 1169–1182). Finally, I explain how Lucretius can be of some help in grasping the controversial relationship between the criterion of πρόληψις and that of ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας ( animi inectus / iactus ), showing in which way the poet seems to consider the latter as a criterion of truth in its own right.

This article proposes a reconstruction of the Sextan critique against the Pythagorean conception of number as principle of all existing things. Taking into consideration all the parallel passages concerning the presentation and the polemic about the Pythagorean doctrine, the present article proposes a division of the sceptical critique into two sections, the first one presenting the Pythagorean reasons to consider the numbers as principle existing apart from numbered things, and the second one presenting the arguments that Sextus himself built against them. This paper will show that this structure is consistent with the sceptical method, which consists in pointing out the ἰσοσθένεια among different positions which leads to suspension of judgment. Regarding the Pythagorean doctrine that emerges from these passages, the present article discusses the way in which Sextus testified a juxtaposition between Pythagorean and Platonic doctrines, probably due to a Middle-Platonic or Neopythagorean elaboration, against which Sextus used Platonic concepts, adopting in original way arguments taken from the Parmenides and the Phaedo . Despite the ἐποχή about the nature of the number, this article will argue that Sextus did not avoid to use the number in practical daily life, in a way that is consistent with the sceptical practical criterion.

The Stoics identified the phantasia with the impression ( typos ) in the soul, or the impressing process ( typōsis ). Alexander of Aphrodisias engages directly with this account at De anima 68.10–21, and argues against the applicability of the impression in a theory of perception in Mantissa 10, especially 133.25–134.23. I analyse Alexander’s polemic account at De anima 68.10–21, I demonstrate that it differs from Chrysippus’ criticism of Cleanthes (contrary to some commentators), and I show how it fits in the context of his argument. From this analysis it will emerge how Alexander uses Stoic ideas to form his Aristotelian account. Then, I show that Alexander, by taking ‘ typos ’ metaphorically, not only prefers the term ‘ enkataleimma ’ over ‘ typos ’ in his theory of phantasia , but he keeps the ‘ typos ’ terminology only to remain faithful to Aristotle’s use (contrary to some commentators).

In Proclus’ Platonic Theology (V 17, 62. 22–63. 2) one can detect a clear recollection of the well-known and much discussed passage 1048b18–35 from Metaphysics IX 6. This passage is transmitted in only one branch of the manuscript tradition and some scholars maintain that it is not by Aristotle or that it does not belong to his Metaphysics . On the other hand, Proclus’ testimony, supported by other passages by Neo-Platonic authors, provides an argument for the original location of the discussed section in Aristotle’s Metaphysics .