Volume 67, Issue 5

Ever since Hegel made poignant the difference between morality and ethical life (“Sittlichkeit”), philosophical discourse in the traditions that developed subsequently, up to and including the Frankfurt school, has oscillated between those poles. This paper starts out with a short exposition of autonomy as one of the few large-scale innovations in the history of philosophy and then proceeds to discuss Hegel’s concept of “Sittlichkeit” and the objections to be raised against it from a Kantian point of view. Political theory, however, has to move beyond pure normativism and consider actual social relations of power, as Marx disclosed. Mapping out this winding trajectory from Kant to Marx provides some perspective that may be illuminating for challenging present-day issues.

Certainly, we sometimes use language creatively and think really new thoughts. However, can we think and speak regardless of the manner in which we have spoken and thought in the past? This seems to be highly improbable. Consequently, nobody would assert something like this. But that being a given, what are the exact reasons that prevent us from radically detaching ourselves from our past practices of thinking and speaking? What roles do past facts play in determining what we are able to think and speak today? This essay looks at the motivation for examining and determining the impact of ‘our history’ on semantics. If possible, these ideas should appeal independently of special or contentious theoretical presuppositions.

In this paper, I discuss whether the view that understanding is the ability to relate the use of an expression to a certain purpose leads to a theory of meaning as usage. In particular, I investigate the view that a theory of meaning relies on the assumption that use is related to immanent purposes of language. I inquire whether it is possible to identify those purposes that seem essential for the use of language. Interpreting Wittgenstein, I argue that this idea relies on a misunderstanding between purposes and effects. Single purposes are not to be conceived of as essential for the use of language. However, if we want to speak of an essential purpose of language, I argue, this purpose is to be conceived of as an end in itself . I draw the conclusion that the use of language is an end in itself rather than a means that fulfils essential purposes.

This paper examines the “critique of historical existence” as a main theme in Karl Löwith’s philosophical works and discusses its emergence, its exact meaning and its contemporary relevance. First, the study shows that Löwith’s critique of History stems from his preoccupation with the question of nihilism. He first discusses the question of “the world as such” in the 1920’s in the context of his anthropological project, and then again in the 1930’s as part of his interpretation of the work of Nietzsche. Secondly, a distinction is proposed between, on the one hand, Löwith’s investigation into the “theological background of the philosophy of history” and, on the other hand, his radical criticism of history as a “historical world”. Finally, the paper sheds light on the difficulties that challenge the project of overcoming the modern historical paradigm, and goes on to discuss the new relevance that Löwith’s philosophy could have today in order to think anew the relationship between nature and history.

In a first part, the contribution goes through different competing and/or complementary concepts of ontography as they appear in phenomenology, object-oriented ontology, science and technology studies, and semiotics. From this comparative examination, the text develops a notion of ontography in contrast to that of ontology. It highlights the ontography of temporal objects and adds a specific media-philosophical approach to it by concentrating on the operations and tools of ontographical writing, registering or drawing being in time. In a second part, ontography is analysed as a techno-aesthetic operation on television, namely as the core of the slow motion replay. Four spectacular examples of instant replay are taken from the history of television that make the writing of an extended and malleable presence through television visible. From that, the contribution develops a hypothesis about the ontographical functioning of the medium of television and of its approach to the world.

The logic of media usage is determined by the self-blinding of the materiality of the medium in the act of its transmitting function. According to the traditional topos of the ‘dying messenger’, a messenger-oriented model of mediality is developed. Contrary to the appearance of the ‘vanishing’ medium, a critical media philosophy has to depict that and how media always shape and constitute what they represent. One phenomenon mostly being invisible in our normal use of texts and pictures is the medium of ‘artificial flatness’ within the framework of a ‘cultural technique of flattening’: scientific, technical and artistic creativity is inconceivable without two-dimensional inscriptions in the form of writings, graphs, diagrams and maps. But how can this imprinting power of inscribed and illustrated surfaces be grasped if at the same time the role of media is understood in terms of transmission, connection, intermediation? Our suggestion is to describe the shaping power of media by the concept of ‘transfiguration’: From a transfigurative perspective, the medium only reveals itself as a trace on its content. Traces are visible transformations in the mode of latency. To manifest this latency, to make the implicit explicit, is then a task of media philosophy. As examples of such a critical-epistemological reflection, the relationship between writing and language, as well as between map and territory, is discussed.

A critique of algorithmic rationalisation offers at best some initial reasons and preliminary ideas. Critique is understood as a reflection on validity. It is limited to an “epistemological investigation” of the limits of the calculable or of what appears “knowable” in the mode of the algorithmic. The argumentation aims at the mathematical foundations of computer science and goes back to the so-called “foundational crisis of mathematics” at the beginning of the 20th century with the attempt to formalise concepts such as calculability, decidability and provability. The Gödel theorems and Turing’s halting problem prove to be essential for any critical approach to “algorithmic rationalisation”. Both, however, do not provide unambiguous results, at best they run towards what later became known as “Gödel’s disjunction”. The chosen path here, however, suggests the opposite way, insofar as, on the one hand, the topos of creativity appear constitutive for what can be regarded as cognitive “algorithmic rationalisation” and which encounters systematic difficulties in the evaluation of non-trivial results. On the other hand, the investigations lead to a comparison between the “mediality” of formally generated structures, which have to distinguish between object-and metalanguages, and the “volatile” differentiality of human thought, which calls for syntactically non-simulatable sense structures.

This essay attempts to characterize the “strict” methodology of Michel Serres (1930–2019), a structuralist philosopher of knowledge, science and culture. On the one hand his works seem to be playful, even literary. On the other hand – and above all, so the author’s thesis – in its consequence they are quite uncompromising: Serres follows a structuralist, if not mathematical, paradigm. Methodically important leitmotifs of Serres’ thinking – for the epistemic context, these are, e. g . the detour, the wandering, the journey, the creation of connections – appear as micrological scenes or (recurring) narrations. They offer small phenomenologies and at the same time explore and expose structures: the interplay between disorder(s) and order(s). In recent years, Serres has become known for his writings on Internet and digitization. But there is also something like Serres’ legal, social, and ecological philosophy – which is well worth looking into.