Volume 67, Issue 4

In the second book of the Confessions , Augustine flabbergasts his interpreters by exaggerating an adolescent escapade (a pear theft) and making it a monstrosity. He conjectures that the pear thieves might have commited the theft purely for the sake of thieving, and thus, that they displayed a kind of evil that is not even presented by the arch-villain of Ciceronian antiquity, the conspirer Catilina. Following Aquinas’ interpretation this comparison has been considered a reductio in most of the relevant literature up to now. This paper presents a different interpretation: Augustine is mostly serious about his claim – and there might be more to his argument than meets the eye. The interpretation developed in the present paper is based on a construal of the pear theft as collective agency.

The article treats the problem of interpretation in its respect to reality by example of Umberto Eco’s moderate ‚realistic‘ position and his criticism of Friedrich Nietzsche, the “father” of postmodernism. Here the strongest arguments on both sides are evaluated: Eco’s “negative realism” pointing out the impossibility of some interpretations and Nietzsche’s thinking out the absolute absence of a privileged position proceeding from which it would be possible to unequivocally identify what is real. The article argues that the crucial point why some interpretations may prove to be stronger or weaker is best described in terms of the concept of power. One however should avoid misconceptions, since power itself is interpretation which nevertheless allows for the gradation of reality, the mobility of its horizons, their shifting and even their potential availability. A much-disputed question of prehistoric times as well as that of death as a limit of interpretability is inter alia included in the analysis. Both classical anti-realistic positions, such as that of Wittgenstein, and the argumentation of contemporary advocates of realism, such as Quentin Meillassoux, are taken into consideration.

In her article, Alcoff argues for the need to examine the reality of race philosophically. According to Alcoff, liberal notions of universality as well as the postmodern critique of essentialism make it difficult to address race and its ongoing significance in social life. By engaging with authors like Charles W. Mills and Paul Gilroy, Alcoff aims to show that it is possible to develop an account of race as social and historical reality without essentializing the category of race.

In his article, Shelby critically engages with a conception of racism that locates racism in the “heart” of individuals. Such a volitional conception, which has been proposed by Jorge Garcia, suffers from several defects, the most important of which are that it is difficult to identify racist attitudes without recourse to racist beliefs and that such a conception of racism does not allow to see how individuals can be complicit in race-based oppression in the absence of racial hatred or ill will. In lieu of a volitional conception of racism, Shelby advances a conception of racism as ideology which makes racist beliefs and their social consequences central to our understanding of racism.

This article examines which lessons political philosophers can learn from discussions within Critical Philosophy of Race. The article assumes a social-constructionist understanding of “race” and focuses on the question of how we can reconcile normative universalism with sensitivity to differences that have been created by processes of racialisation. To answer this question, it looks exemplarily at debates within three different fields of political philosophy: normativity, politics, and law. First, it presents objections voiced by critical race theory against liberal, ideal conceptions of justice. Second, the article reconstructs the main arguments for and against affirmative action as a policy measure directed at minority groups. Third, it focuses on racial inequalities in the context of penal law. By way of conclusion, it suggests how debates around justice and punishment and the conceptual lenses offered by CPoR can be fruitfully applied to the German context.

Mary Midgley belongs to a small group of most inspiring women philosophers of the 20 th and early 21 st century. Her impressive oeuvre, characterised by an exceptionally clear and witty style, combines contributions to such different fields of philosophical inquiry as moral philosophy, philosophical anthropology, philosophy of science in general and of biology in particular, as well as philosophy of religion. With her early article “The Concept of Beastliness”, we have something like a germ cell of her philosophy, introducing a range of concerns that will remain central to her work. The commentary focuses on five of them, traces how they show up in later works of Midgley’s, and suggests how they could inform philosophizing about humans and (other) animals today. These are, first, Midgley’s adherence to the concept of ‘human nature’. Second, her insistence that a comparative, ethologically informed perspective on humans and (other) animals helps to refute myths about both the (generically understood) animal and the human animal. Third, her alerting us to the fact that concepts of ‘human nature’ always influence our moral self-understanding. Fourth, her focus on the positive, open instincts in humans like caring, friendship, loyalty, or sociality that exist not only alongside but in a complex interplay with negative, open instincts such as aggression, and the idea that both classes of instincts can be shaped to some extent. And, finally, her focus on the conditions of social life that are important for people to be able to structure their lives in meaningful ways.

In this article, I propose to examine the origins and follow the process of the development of philosophy in Mexico, its periods, currents and most important features, and some of the problems that it is confronting in modern times. One of the guiding ideas that structure this reflection is that philosophy in Mexico has developed along the horizon of a series of economic, political and social events to which philosophy itself has attempted to respond but that, in a manner both simultaneous and decisive, have contributed to configuring philosophy itself. Among these events I would emphasize, first, the experience of the Mexican Revolution, but would add the experience of the Russian Revolution, World Wars I and II, the explosion of the atomic bomb and, later, the Cuban Revolution, the 1968 Student Movement in Mexico, the nuclear catastrophe in Chernobyl, the fall of the Berlin Wall and, more recently, the emergence of the Neo-Zapatista movement in the country, as well as the ecological disasters that characterized the 20 th century. Nor can we ignore the great challenges that have emerged in recent decades due to the worldwide scourge of inequality, and the extensive migratory movements from poor countries to rich ones caused by the overwhelming force of diverse forms of political and religious fundamentalism, climate change and new forms and waves of violence on both the national and international levels. The recent development of philosophy in Mexico has been marked by growing professionalization and specialization and the formation of a solid community of philosophers with specialized journals that provide spaces for reasoned public discussion and debate that is subject to the argumentative constraints proper to the discipline and conforms to the criteria established by a community that finds itself coming into ever-closer contact with other philosophical communities in and beyond the Spanish-American world. However, and paradoxically, beside this emphasis on specialization, philosophy has lost some of its presence in the public space and grand national discussions and debates. As another central element of its discourse in recent decades we can mention the fact that, parallel to increasing specialization, philosophy in Mexico has been conducted, through its own development, towards greater interaction and dialogue with other sciences and disciplines, leading it to insert itself into a learning process that has allowed it to potentiate the development and advancement of philosophy itself.