Volume 40, Issue 98

One way to distinguish among different varieties of supervaluationism is by their treatment of the entailment relation. Different versions of supervaluationism differ in their plausibility depending on whether particular intuitively plausible entailments and types of entailments are treated as valid, and on what notion of validity is employed. One important collection of entailments is exemplified by what a classical-style definition asserts. At least some classical-style definitions in terms of metaphysically necessary and jointly sufficient conditions are true, and thus we have in hand another criterion by which to judge competing supervaluationist accounts. The paper considers which accounts stand or fall given this criterion, and a general conclusion is that the criterion points away from all local notions of validity. The paper also considers the clash between intuitions in support of definitions and those for and against various supervaluationist accounts of validity, whether local or not.

This contribution discusses the fundamental change in Wittgenstein’s methodological approach to philosophical problems, which he developed upon his return to Cambridge at the beginning of 1929. While still adhering to the Tractarian project, the paper, “Some Remarks on Logical Form”, also attempts to address several of its shortcomings. Along with a newfound interest in analyzing the logical structure of actual phenomena (as given in immediate experience), Wittgenstein attempts to develop a form of symbolism capable of precisely depicting these phenomenal structures, and thereby precluding the formulation of pseudo-propositions. The combination of these two innovations eventually lead Wittgenstein to abandon the Tractarian project in favor of pursuing what he later referred to as a phenomenological or primary language. And while Wittgenstein’s phenomenology was apparently short-lived, both his investigative approach and understanding of the interplay between language and experience underwent a lasting and profound shift.

Zusammenfassung Erinnerung ist für Wittgenstein ein komplexer Vorgang, der mit einer Vielzahl von Schwierigkeiten verbunden ist. Dies gilt besonders für seine Überlegungen zur Erinnerung einer Absicht – ein in der Wittgenstein-Literatur bis dato vernachlässigter Aspekt, obwohl er in diversen Manuskripten des Nachlasses hervorsticht. Nach Wittgenstein erlaubt uns der Erinnerungsvorgang nicht, uns eine vermeintliche Absicht „vor Augen zu führen“, dennoch verwenden wir den sprachlichen Ausdruck, um mittels einer Erinnerungsbeschreibung eine vergangene Absicht zu äußern. Nur was bringen wir damit aber zum Ausdruck? – Da die Worte sich weder auf Tatsachen beziehen noch mit diesen korrespondieren, kommt es zur paradoxen Situation, dass jemand sich des Inhalts einer Absicht zu erinnern meint, nicht aber der einstigen Worte. Dies wirft im Umkehrschluss die Frage auf, was unter diesen Umständen die Artikulation der Erinnerung einer Absicht überhaupt aussagen soll und kann, und weiterhin, was der Unterschied zu einer gegenwärtigen Absichtserklärung ist.

The core idea of Davidson’s philosophy of language is that a theory of truth constructed as an empirical theory by a radical interpreter is a theory of meaning. I discuss an ambiguity that arises from Davidson's notion of interpretation: it can either be understood as the hypothetical process of constructing a theory of truth for a language or as a process that actually happens when speakers communicate. I argue that each disambiguation is problematic and does not result in a theory of meaning.

What does it mean to understand something? I approach this question by comparing understanding with knowledge. Like knowledge, understanding comes, at least prima facia , in three varieties: propositional, interrogative and objectual. I argue that explanatory understanding (this being the most important form of interrogative understanding) and objectual understanding are not reducible to one another and are neither identical with, nor even a form of, the corresponding type of knowledge (nor any other type of knowledge). My discussion suggests that definitions of the concepts of explanatory and of objectual understanding must include a commitment condition, a grasping condition, an answering-the-facts condition, and an epistemically internal justification condition, but no further external anti-luck condition. On this basis I argue against reducing explanatory understanding to propositional understanding, and in favour of identifying propositional understanding with propositional knowledge.