Wittgenstein’s return: A methodological transition
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James Thompson
Abstract
This contribution discusses the fundamental change in Wittgenstein’s methodological approach to philosophical problems, which he developed upon his return to Cambridge at the beginning of 1929. While still adhering to the Tractarian project, the paper, “Some Remarks on Logical Form”, also attempts to address several of its shortcomings. Along with a newfound interest in analyzing the logical structure of actual phenomena (as given in immediate experience), Wittgenstein attempts to develop a form of symbolism capable of precisely depicting these phenomenal structures, and thereby precluding the formulation of pseudo-propositions. The combination of these two innovations eventually lead Wittgenstein to abandon the Tractarian project in favor of pursuing what he later referred to as a phenomenological or primary language. And while Wittgenstein’s phenomenology was apparently short-lived, both his investigative approach and understanding of the interplay between language and experience underwent a lasting and profound shift.
References
Kienzler, W. (1997). Wittgensteins Wende zu seiner Spätphilosophie 1930-1932. Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main.Search in Google Scholar
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Thompson, J. (2008) Wittgenstein on Phenomenology and Experience: An Investigation of Wittgenstein’s Middle Period. Bergen University Press: Bergen.Search in Google Scholar
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© 2014 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Frontmatter
- Articles
- Supervaluationist entailment and definitions
- Wittgenstein’s return: A methodological transition
- „Glaub nicht immer, daß Du Deine Worte von Tatsachen abliest.“
- What is interpretation? A dilemma for Davidson
- Types of understanding: Their nature and their relation to knowledge
- Book Review
- Brun, Georg/Hirsch Hadorn, Gertrude: Textanalyse in den Wissenschaften. Inhalte und Argumente analysieren und verstehen; Zürich 2009 (UTB 3139).
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Frontmatter
- Articles
- Supervaluationist entailment and definitions
- Wittgenstein’s return: A methodological transition
- „Glaub nicht immer, daß Du Deine Worte von Tatsachen abliest.“
- What is interpretation? A dilemma for Davidson
- Types of understanding: Their nature and their relation to knowledge
- Book Review
- Brun, Georg/Hirsch Hadorn, Gertrude: Textanalyse in den Wissenschaften. Inhalte und Argumente analysieren und verstehen; Zürich 2009 (UTB 3139).
