Volume 48, Issue 4

Socialization theories suggest that, due to social change and technological transformation, peers and media have become important institutions of socialization for young people. Assuming that male adolescents use digital games for processes of peer self-socialization, this article investigates the values they mediate in digital games and how these values are related to their practice (with a focus on harassment) in digital games. Applying a qualitative research design, 36 male adolescents who frequently play various (multiplayer) online games were interviewed about their values and practices when gaming. The results show that the young gamers share individualistic values promoting performance, competition, and achievement, which seem to facilitate practices of online harassment. We conclude that, in their gaming practices, male adolescents mediate and reproduce neoliberal values as increasingly shared by society. Regarding their practices of harassment, however, they seem to use digital games as a moratorium that lets them break free from societal restrictions.

Risk and crisis communication (RCC) is a complex constellation of multiple actors, platforms, and voices. It involves institutional actors but also laypeople. Participation by social media users can both facilitate and obstruct effective RCC. The present study draws on in-depth interviews with Swedish Facebook users, and explores motivational factors for lay participation in RCC in the context of vaccination utilizing Peter Dahlgren’s (2011) model. The contributions of this study are threefold. First, it identifies three dominant clusters of participation motivations: personal interest, information brokerage, and persuasion. Second, the results show that Facebook sociality is characterized by asynchronous communication, loops, and widespread hostility. Third, degrees of content visibility set up “zones of peace” (backstage, safe communication spaces) and “zones of fight” (frontstage, open sub-arenas where various views on vaccination are debated). Moreover, the study finds that these forms of sociality and levels of visibility can both strengthen and undermine user motivations.

The rhetoric employed by right-wing populist parties (RWPPs) has been seen as a driver for their success. This right-wing populist (RWP) rhetoric is partly characterized by the use of anti-immigration metaphors and hyperboles, which likely appeal to voters’ grievances. We tested the persuasive impact of figuratively framed RWP rhetoric among a unique sample of Dutch RWPP voters, reporting an experiment with a 2 (metaphor: present, absent) x 2 (hyperbole: present, absent) between-subjects design. Our findings challenge prevailing ideas about how supportive voters respond to RWP rhetoric: Figurative language did not steer voters more in line with RWP ideas but pushed their opinion further away. These unexpected boomerang effects mainly held for weakly identified voters. This suggests that RWPP voters support their party, not because of but despite their rhetoric. Being heard in their grievances, rather than told what to grieve about, seems to be a main driver for RWPP support.

This article outlines the relationship that cultural capital, which is identified as a media user’s education level, shares with news media consumption patterns, civic engagement, and cultural participation. The article’s findings are based on data gathered during a 2015 investigation on news media consumption conducted by a group of European researchers as part of a comparative research project, supplemented with data from a survey on a random sample of Polish citizens conducted in May 2019. The project for the empirical 2015 study aimed to examine the principles of building individual media repertoires as a representation of media usage patterns and experiences related to news media consumption. The study focused on universal aspects of news media consumption, while simultaneously allowing for the discovery of aspects of news media use that are specific to the individual countries participating in the study: Germany, Denmark, Israel, Belgium-Fr., Belgium-Flanders, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, Croatia, and Poland.

Antisemitism is on the rise. Recently, discussions have considered so-called “no-go zones for Jews” (city areas Jews should avoid to reduce the likelihood of being attacked). In this context and drawing from attribution theory, we examined if news consumers perceive a Jewish hate crime victim as partly responsible for being attacked when news coverage explicitly emphasizes that the victim displayed religious symbols (kippah) in a certain inner-city location. We conducted a quota-based survey experiment (N = 392) in Germany (4 groups, between-subjects design) and randomly exposed participants to news coverage about an anti-Semitic attack. The article either emphasized that the Jewish victim displayed religious symbols (kippah) or not, and highlighted the specific location of the attack (Berlin synagogue vs. deprived inner-city district of Berlin). Moderated mediation analysis suggested that participants perceived the victim’s behavior to be more provocative when the news article highlighted that the victim displayed religious symbols and when the attack occurred in a deprived Berlin district. Yet, effects were only detected for individuals with low (vs. high) levels of education. Perceived provocativeness in turn increased victim blaming indicating that some individuals indirectly regarded the Jewish victim to be partly responsible for being attacked.

Lower levels of news use are generally understood to be associated with less political engagement among citizens. But while some people simply have a low preference for news, others avoid the news intentionally. So far little is known about the relationship between active news avoidance and civic engagement in society, a void this study has set out to fill. Based on a four-wave general population panel survey in the Netherlands, conducted between April and July 2020 (N = 1,084) during a crisis situation, this research-in-brief investigates the development of news avoidance and pro-social civic engagement over time. Results suggest that higher news topic avoidance results in higher levels of civic engagement. The study discusses different explanations for why less news can mean more engagement.

In the light of a vast political information ‘buffet’, so-called news-avoiders stay away from the news for indefinite periods of time. Recent research suggests that news avoidance can be intentional or unintentional. However, research has mostly focused on one form of news avoidance or has not differentiated at all. Based on survey data, this study (a) identifies and compares motivations for intentional and unintentional avoidance and (b) investigates drivers of different news avoidance motives. Findings suggest that, overall, avoidance is rooted in the preference for other pastimes, with intentional avoiders also being tired of news and seeing it as too negative, biased, and unreliable. Further, different motives are driven by specific characteristics: Political knowledge and internal efficacy relate to ‘cognitive’ motives, empathy, and being negativity-prone to ‘emotional’ motives, while external efficacy relates to ‘political’ motives.

Populist attributions of blame have important effects on citizens’ attitudes, cognitions, emotions, and behaviors. Extending previous studies that have mostly looked at populist messages blaming political elites, we use an online survey experiment (N = 805) to investigate the effects of blaming different elitist actors in populist and non-populist ways: (1) political elites, (2) corporate elites, (3) scientific elites, and (4) a combination of these elites. We compare mere causal responsibility attribution to populist blame attributions that highlight a central opposition between “pure ordinary people” and “corrupt elites” to tease out the specific effect of populist rhetoric. Results suggest that populist messages blaming all elites have stronger effects than isolated cues. Furthermore, populist blame attribution leads to more negative perceptions of the elites than non-populist blame attribution. The finding that populist frames can – under some conditions – activate negative perceptions toward different elites is alarming in times of declining trust in societal institutions, and calls for a more encompassing understanding of populists’ scapegoats.

This paper draws evidence from a national survey conducted in the Republic of Cyprus. Respondents provided evidence about their own self-promotion on social media while assessing other users’ personal salience online. Furthermore, they provided evidence about their own reactions toward other people’s personal salience. The study shows that respondents display affective, perceptional, as well as behavioral reactions toward other people’s online visibility. Demographic characteristics along with certain types of control variables are associated with individuals’ personal salience. Although transferring personal salience constitutes a segmented social media influence, this survey shows that it is recognized as a widespread objective and priority by ordinary individuals.