Traditionally, scholars have taken homoiôsis theôi in the Theaetetus digression (172c–177c) to require neglect of particulars, but they have noted that although Socrates advocates it, he does not live such a life. To explain the discrepancy, Mahoney and Rue both argue that we need to reinterpret godlikeness to require active engagement in the city. I reject their reinterpretations and I revise the traditional view, arguing that godlikeness is not a single ideal. Instead, I argue, Plato provides several different portraits of godlikeness that together suggest interest in particulars makes the person neither better nor worse as a philosopher.
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Requires Authentication UnlicensedSocrates, the philosopher in the Theaetetus digression (172c–177c), and the ideal of homoiôsis theôiLicensedApril 6, 2011
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Requires Authentication UnlicensedThe Unity of the Virtues and the Degeneration of KallipolisLicensedApril 6, 2011
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Requires Authentication UnlicensedWhy Five Worlds? Plato's Timaeus 55C–DLicensedApril 6, 2011
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Requires Authentication UnlicensedSoul and Elemental Motion in Aristotle's Physics VIII 4LicensedApril 6, 2011
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Requires Authentication UnlicensedNatural and Neutral States in Plato's PhilebusLicensedApril 6, 2011