Band 97, Heft 2

Abstract: In the Timaeus , Plato uses an apparently redundant number of two right-angled elementary triangles – six scalene triangles and four isosceles triangles – to construct, respectively, the equilateral triangle and the square, the two faces that bound the solids underpinning the four genera of the world. I argue that these constructions involve a circle circumscribed about each face, and that the notion of “circularity”, as well as the forms of uniformity and self-similarity may have inspired them. With Euclid’s Elements in mind, I propose that analysis of the two faces as a function of the parameters of the circles circumscribing them and of the two elementary triangles answers questions that have long puzzled commentators of the Timaeus .

Abstract: In this study, we look at two interpretive puzzles associated with the thought of Avicenna that are still of intrinsic philosophical interest today. The first concerns to what extent, if at all, Avicenna’s deity can be said to act freely. The second concerns to what extent, if at all, humans within Avicenna’s philosophical system can be said to act freely. It is our contention that only through a careful analysis of Avicenna’s theory of action can one begin to assess his position concerning the status of the will and so provide a satisfactory response to these two interpretative issues. We hope to show that Avicenna can account for divine freedom and that, at least in the case of prophets and sages, humans too are capable of free action.

Abstract: The paper argues for a formal-causal account of Spinoza’s metaphysics. Its basic claim is that neither relations of ideas alone nor efficient causality – especially if interpreted “mechanistically” – articulate the basic sense of the Spinozistic ‘cause’. Instead it is formal causality, as understood by Descartes and other 17 th -century mathematicians on the basis of Aristotleʼs Posterior Analytics , which fits best both with the textual evidence and with the more general conceptual constraints of Spinoza’s metaphysics. Building on the work of Carraud and Viljanen, the paper develops a more precise concept of formal causality and a systematic formal-causal account of Spinoza’s metaphysics. It gives this account footing in new arguments, shows its explanatory superiority to rival interpretations and connects it to other Spinozistic doctrines.

Abstract: This paper takes a new approach to understanding Hume’s view on causality, taking ontological as well as semantic issues into account. It attempts to attain three different goals. In the first place, it dismisses the main arguments that were put forward by the New Humeans in order to show that Hume must be regarded as a sceptical realist with respect to causality. Secondly, by employing a genetic reading of Hume’s two definitions of causality, the paper argues for an interpretation of Hume that takes his empirical criterion of meaning as seriously as possible. And thirdly, it presents a proposal to analyse the meaning of causal sentences from a Humean perspective. According to this approach, the meaning of causal sentences divides into a descriptive and a projective component. By taking advantage of Hume’s general view on meaning, we can underpin the projectivist interpretation of Hume’s theory of causality with exegetical evidence.