Kapitel in diesem Buch

1. Frontmatter i
2. Contents v
3. Illustrations vii
4. Chapter 1. Capitalism and the Crisis: Bankers, Bonuses, Ideology, and Ignorance 1
5. PART I. The Crisis in Historical Perspective
6. Chapter 2. An Accident Waiting to Happen: Securities Regulation and Financial Deregulation 69
7. Chapter 3. Monetary Policy, Credit Extension, and Housing Bubbles, 2008 and 1929 107
8. PART II. What Went Wrong (and What Didn’t)?
9. Chapter 4. The Anatomy of a Murder: Who Killed America’s Economy? 139
10. Chapter 5. Monetary Policy, Economic Policy and the Financial Crisis: An Empirical Analysis of What Went Wrong 150
11. Chapter 6. Housing Initiatives and Other Policy Factors 172
12. Chapter 7. How Securitization Concentrated Risk in the Financial Sector 183
13. Chapter 8. A Regulated Meltdown: The Basel Rules and Banks’ Leverage 200
14. Chapter 9. The Credit-Rating Agencies and the Subprime Debacle 228
15. Chapter 10. Credit-Default Swaps and the Crisis 238
16. PART III. Economists, Economics, and the Financial Crisis
17. Chapter 11. The Crisis of 2008: Lessons for and from Economics 251
18. Chapter 12. The Financial Crisis and the Systemic Failure of the Economics Profession 262
19. Afterword. The Causes of the Financial Crisis 279
20. Abbreviations and Acronyms 295
21. Notes 297
22. References 319
23. Contributors 337
24. Index 343
25. Acknowledgments 359