Startseite 3 Russia and the Syrian civil war
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3 Russia and the Syrian civil war

  • Derek Averre
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Abstract

Chapter 2 focuses on the Syrian civil war, international responses to the crisis and Russia’s political, diplomatic and humanitarian involvement through successive phases of the conflict. We investigate its causes and consequences, analysing Moscow’s diplomatic confrontation with the West and examining Russia’s political and military support for the Assad government in the various multilateral negotiating formats aimed at securing a resolution of the conflict, in particular the UN-sponsored Geneva talks and the trilateral Astana format led by Russia, Iran and Turkey. We assess the impact of Russia’s military role in the civil war and how it changed regional security arrangements, going on to consider how the discord between Russia and the West has been reflected in the ‘information war’ – not least over the alleged use of chemical weapons by Assad’s forces – that has vitiated attempts to manage the conflict. The chapter concludes by challenging common arguments in the academic and expert literature about Russia’s intentions and whether its Syria policy might signal further interventions to support friendly MENA governments and consolidate its positions in the region. We argue that Russia has sought an inclusive transition in order to preserve Syrian statehood and prevent further instability; however, its support for Assad and use of disinformation have combined to undercut trust and cooperation with the West. We conclude that Russia faces considerable constraints in dealing with regional crises and must seek support from the Western powers in order to resolve the Syria conflict and limit its future military engagement.

Abstract

Chapter 2 focuses on the Syrian civil war, international responses to the crisis and Russia’s political, diplomatic and humanitarian involvement through successive phases of the conflict. We investigate its causes and consequences, analysing Moscow’s diplomatic confrontation with the West and examining Russia’s political and military support for the Assad government in the various multilateral negotiating formats aimed at securing a resolution of the conflict, in particular the UN-sponsored Geneva talks and the trilateral Astana format led by Russia, Iran and Turkey. We assess the impact of Russia’s military role in the civil war and how it changed regional security arrangements, going on to consider how the discord between Russia and the West has been reflected in the ‘information war’ – not least over the alleged use of chemical weapons by Assad’s forces – that has vitiated attempts to manage the conflict. The chapter concludes by challenging common arguments in the academic and expert literature about Russia’s intentions and whether its Syria policy might signal further interventions to support friendly MENA governments and consolidate its positions in the region. We argue that Russia has sought an inclusive transition in order to preserve Syrian statehood and prevent further instability; however, its support for Assad and use of disinformation have combined to undercut trust and cooperation with the West. We conclude that Russia faces considerable constraints in dealing with regional crises and must seek support from the Western powers in order to resolve the Syria conflict and limit its future military engagement.

Heruntergeladen am 9.9.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.7765/9781526175823.00006/html
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