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9 Making sense of human dignity

Abstract

Discussions of human dignity have burgeoned in bioethics. John Harris, amongst others, has been highly critical of the vague, and often unreasoned appeals that this involves. Whilst agreeing with much of his stance, it is argued that the concept of human dignity is not merely important but essential for bioethics. Various ways in which dignity has been appealed to in order to constrain autonomous action for self-harm or action that effects only non-autonomous beings ("dignity as constraint") are criticised, some of which appeal to Kant’s idea of human dignity. However, as applied to non-autonomous beings, this is a misuse of Kant, and anyway Kant’s use of the idea manifests a tension between using dignity as a constraint on autonomy and seeing it as reflecting the fundamental value of autonomy. A conception of "dignity as empowerment" founded on the moral philosophy of Alan Gewirth is outlined and defended.

Abstract

Discussions of human dignity have burgeoned in bioethics. John Harris, amongst others, has been highly critical of the vague, and often unreasoned appeals that this involves. Whilst agreeing with much of his stance, it is argued that the concept of human dignity is not merely important but essential for bioethics. Various ways in which dignity has been appealed to in order to constrain autonomous action for self-harm or action that effects only non-autonomous beings ("dignity as constraint") are criticised, some of which appeal to Kant’s idea of human dignity. However, as applied to non-autonomous beings, this is a misuse of Kant, and anyway Kant’s use of the idea manifests a tension between using dignity as a constraint on autonomy and seeing it as reflecting the fundamental value of autonomy. A conception of "dignity as empowerment" founded on the moral philosophy of Alan Gewirth is outlined and defended.

Chapters in this book

  1. Front matter i
  2. Dedication v
  3. Contents vii
  4. List of contributors ix
  5. Series editors’ forewords xvi
  6. Acknowledgements xx
  7. Part I Introductions
  8. 1 Editors’ introduction 3
  9. 2 Thought and memory 16
  10. Part II Grounding moral arguments
  11. 3 On moral nose 33
  12. 4 Hanging around with Jackson 44
  13. 5 The unbearable desire for explicitness and rationality in bioethics 56
  14. 6 Moral epistemology and the survival lottery 64
  15. 7 Harris and the criticism of the status quo 75
  16. 8 The natural as a moral category 85
  17. 9 Making sense of human dignity 92
  18. 10 Why we should save the anthropocentric person 102
  19. Part III From ethics to policy and practice
  20. 11 Why the reasonable man is not always right? 119
  21. 12 Why the body matters 131
  22. 13 Harris’s principle of justice in health care 142
  23. 14 Eqalyty revisited 152
  24. 15 The safety of the people and the case against invasive health promotion 163
  25. 16 Could we reduce racism with one easy dip? 170
  26. 17 Against mumps, Meursault, McDonald’s and Marlboro 181
  27. 18 Killing and allowing to die 190
  28. Part IV John Harris responds
  29. 19 Response to and reflections on chapters 3–18 201
  30. Bibliography 226
  31. Index 238
From reason to practice in bioethics
This chapter is in the book From reason to practice in bioethics
https://doi.org/10.7765/9780719098031.00017

Chapters in this book

  1. Front matter i
  2. Dedication v
  3. Contents vii
  4. List of contributors ix
  5. Series editors’ forewords xvi
  6. Acknowledgements xx
  7. Part I Introductions
  8. 1 Editors’ introduction 3
  9. 2 Thought and memory 16
  10. Part II Grounding moral arguments
  11. 3 On moral nose 33
  12. 4 Hanging around with Jackson 44
  13. 5 The unbearable desire for explicitness and rationality in bioethics 56
  14. 6 Moral epistemology and the survival lottery 64
  15. 7 Harris and the criticism of the status quo 75
  16. 8 The natural as a moral category 85
  17. 9 Making sense of human dignity 92
  18. 10 Why we should save the anthropocentric person 102
  19. Part III From ethics to policy and practice
  20. 11 Why the reasonable man is not always right? 119
  21. 12 Why the body matters 131
  22. 13 Harris’s principle of justice in health care 142
  23. 14 Eqalyty revisited 152
  24. 15 The safety of the people and the case against invasive health promotion 163
  25. 16 Could we reduce racism with one easy dip? 170
  26. 17 Against mumps, Meursault, McDonald’s and Marlboro 181
  27. 18 Killing and allowing to die 190
  28. Part IV John Harris responds
  29. 19 Response to and reflections on chapters 3–18 201
  30. Bibliography 226
  31. Index 238
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