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16 Could we reduce racism with one easy dip?

What a thought experiment about race-colour change makes us see

Abstract

Consider a simple thought-experiment: What if it were possible, say by dipping into a skin dye bath or using special pigmentation-altering lights in a converted tanning bed, to change one’s skin colour temporarily and reversibly? You can be "Shirley Temple" white this week, "Louis Armstrong" black next week, "Genghis Khan" or "Madame Butterfly" Asian the week after that. Temporary skin colour change could be used to combat racism in hiring, education, admission to special societies; to facilitate social interaction in teaching or travel; or to pursue aesthetic and self-identity interests. But would race-colour change be deceptive or morally problematic? At issue is whether a person is somehow "really" a specific colour and if so, whether it would violate "race integrity" (if there is such a thing) to change it. Is skin colour a basic constituent of personal identity? The underlying theoretical race ontology issues involve racial skepticism, racial constructionism, and population naturalism, and whether deracialised interaction among individuals and peoples of the world might be possible.

Abstract

Consider a simple thought-experiment: What if it were possible, say by dipping into a skin dye bath or using special pigmentation-altering lights in a converted tanning bed, to change one’s skin colour temporarily and reversibly? You can be "Shirley Temple" white this week, "Louis Armstrong" black next week, "Genghis Khan" or "Madame Butterfly" Asian the week after that. Temporary skin colour change could be used to combat racism in hiring, education, admission to special societies; to facilitate social interaction in teaching or travel; or to pursue aesthetic and self-identity interests. But would race-colour change be deceptive or morally problematic? At issue is whether a person is somehow "really" a specific colour and if so, whether it would violate "race integrity" (if there is such a thing) to change it. Is skin colour a basic constituent of personal identity? The underlying theoretical race ontology issues involve racial skepticism, racial constructionism, and population naturalism, and whether deracialised interaction among individuals and peoples of the world might be possible.

Kapitel in diesem Buch

  1. Front matter i
  2. Dedication v
  3. Contents vii
  4. List of contributors ix
  5. Series editors’ forewords xvi
  6. Acknowledgements xx
  7. Part I Introductions
  8. 1 Editors’ introduction 3
  9. 2 Thought and memory 16
  10. Part II Grounding moral arguments
  11. 3 On moral nose 33
  12. 4 Hanging around with Jackson 44
  13. 5 The unbearable desire for explicitness and rationality in bioethics 56
  14. 6 Moral epistemology and the survival lottery 64
  15. 7 Harris and the criticism of the status quo 75
  16. 8 The natural as a moral category 85
  17. 9 Making sense of human dignity 92
  18. 10 Why we should save the anthropocentric person 102
  19. Part III From ethics to policy and practice
  20. 11 Why the reasonable man is not always right? 119
  21. 12 Why the body matters 131
  22. 13 Harris’s principle of justice in health care 142
  23. 14 Eqalyty revisited 152
  24. 15 The safety of the people and the case against invasive health promotion 163
  25. 16 Could we reduce racism with one easy dip? 170
  26. 17 Against mumps, Meursault, McDonald’s and Marlboro 181
  27. 18 Killing and allowing to die 190
  28. Part IV John Harris responds
  29. 19 Response to and reflections on chapters 3–18 201
  30. Bibliography 226
  31. Index 238
From reason to practice in bioethics
Ein Kapitel aus dem Buch From reason to practice in bioethics
https://doi.org/10.7765/9780719098031.00025

Kapitel in diesem Buch

  1. Front matter i
  2. Dedication v
  3. Contents vii
  4. List of contributors ix
  5. Series editors’ forewords xvi
  6. Acknowledgements xx
  7. Part I Introductions
  8. 1 Editors’ introduction 3
  9. 2 Thought and memory 16
  10. Part II Grounding moral arguments
  11. 3 On moral nose 33
  12. 4 Hanging around with Jackson 44
  13. 5 The unbearable desire for explicitness and rationality in bioethics 56
  14. 6 Moral epistemology and the survival lottery 64
  15. 7 Harris and the criticism of the status quo 75
  16. 8 The natural as a moral category 85
  17. 9 Making sense of human dignity 92
  18. 10 Why we should save the anthropocentric person 102
  19. Part III From ethics to policy and practice
  20. 11 Why the reasonable man is not always right? 119
  21. 12 Why the body matters 131
  22. 13 Harris’s principle of justice in health care 142
  23. 14 Eqalyty revisited 152
  24. 15 The safety of the people and the case against invasive health promotion 163
  25. 16 Could we reduce racism with one easy dip? 170
  26. 17 Against mumps, Meursault, McDonald’s and Marlboro 181
  27. 18 Killing and allowing to die 190
  28. Part IV John Harris responds
  29. 19 Response to and reflections on chapters 3–18 201
  30. Bibliography 226
  31. Index 238
Heruntergeladen am 1.5.2026 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.7765/9780719098031.00025/html?lang=de
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