27. Some Simple Economics of Voting and Not Voting

Kapitel in diesem Buch

1. Frontmatter 1
2. Preface 9
3. List of Contributors 11
4. Introduction 15
5. Part I: Perspectives on the Usefulness of Economics as a Guide for Social Policy
6. 1. The Economic Approach to Social Policy Questions: Some Methodological Perspectives 17
7. 2. Consensus and Controversy in Political Economy 37
8. 3. On the Limited "Relevance" of Economics 54
9. 4. Science and Ideology in Economics 67
10. 5. Dissent in Economics: The Convergence of Extremes 79
11. Part II: Application of Economic Thinking to Some Particular Social Problems
12. A. Crime and Punishment
13. 7. An Economic Approach to Crime 109
14. 8. Equity versus Efficiency in Law Enforcement 124
15. B. Higher Education and the Dissemination of Information
16. 9. Resources for Higher Education: An Economist's View 132
17. 10. The University and the Price System 153
18. C. The Environment
19. 11. Economists on the Doomsday Models: A Review of The Limits to Growth, by Donella H. Meadows et al, and \Norid Dynamics and Urban Dynamics, by Jay W. Forrester 166
20. 12. Population and Environmental Quality 173
21. 13. The Economics of Fatal Mistakes: Fiscal Mechanisms for Preserving Endangered Predators 187
22. D. Revenue Sharing and the Drawing of Political Boundary Lines
23. 14. Federalism: Problems of Scale 213
24. 15. Revenue Sharing: Alternative to Rational Fiscal Federalism? 225
25. Part III: Economists on Equity, Justice, and the Distribution of Income
26. 16. A Menu of Distributional Considerations 245
27. 17. On Limiting the Domain of Inequality 276
28. 18. Director's Law of Public Income Redistribution 290
29. 19. Two Concepts of Equity and Their Implications for Public Policy 300
30. 20. The Utilitarian Contract: A Generalization of Rawls' Theory of Justice 313
31. Part IV: Economists on Governmental and Political Failure
32. A. Deviation from the Ideal in Governmental Behavior
33. 21. Toward Analysis of Closed Behavioral Systems 335
34. 22. The Peculiar Economics of Bureaucracy 349
35. 23. Divergences between Individual and Total Costs Within Government 362
36. B. Problems of Informed Voting
37. 24. A Program for Direct and Proxy Voting in the Legislative Process 369
38. 25. On Homo Politicus and the Instant Referendum 376
39. 26. Representative Democracy via Random Selection 381
40. 27. Some Simple Economics of Voting and Not Voting 393
41. C. Are There Systematic Biases in Government Budget Size?
42. 28. Risk Avoidance and Political Advertising: Neglected Issues in the Literature on Budget Size in a Democracy 405
43. 29. Attitudes toward Risk and the Relative Size of the Public Sector 434
44. D. Rationalizing our Political Decision-making
45. 30. Solving the Intensity Problem in Representative Democracy 444
46. Part V: Economics and Economists in the Policy Process
47. 31. The Economist and Presidential Leadership 475
48. 32. Reflections on Political Economy 482
49. 33. The American Council of Economic Advisers and the German Sachverstaendigenrat: A Study in the Economics of Advice 490
50. 34. Muddling Through: An Alternative View of the Decision Process 499
51. 35. A Modest Proposal 511
52. 36. A Defense of the CEA as an Instrument for Giving Economic Policy Advice 520
53. Index of Names 524