9. Intellect, Will, and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities

Kapitel in diesem Buch

1. Frontmatter i
2. Contents v
3. Introduction 1
4. Part I THE CONCEPT OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
5. 1. Freedom and Resentment 45
6. 2. On "Freedom and Resentment" 67
7. 3. The Importance of Free Will 101
8. 4. Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme 119
9. Part II HIERARCHY, RATIONALITY, AND THE "REAL SELF"
10. 5. The Real Self View (In Which a Nonautonomous Conception of Free Will and Responsibility Is Examined and Criticized) 151
11. 6. Identification and Wholeheartedness 170
12. 7. What Happens When Someone Acts? 188
13. 8. Sanctification, Hardening of the Heart, and Frankfurt's Concept of Free Will 211
14. Part III MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES
15. 9. Intellect, Will, and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities 237
16. 10. Responsibility, Agent-Causation, and Freedom: An Eighteenth-Century View 263
17. 11. What We Are Morally Responsible For 286
18. 12. Incompatibilism without the Principle of Alternative Possibilities 296
19. 13. Causing and Being Responsible for What Is Inevitable 310
20. 14. Responsibility for Consequences 322
21. Bibliography 349
22. Contributors 357
23. Index 359