Chapters in this book

1. Frontmatter i
2. CONTENTS v
3. Acknowledgments ix
4. Introduction xi
5. 1. A HURRIED TRIP TO MOSCOW IN 1974 TO NEGOTIATE THE THRESHOLD NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY 1
6. 2. DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 7
7. 3. FROM THE EARLY NEGOTIATIONS TO HALT NUCLEAR TESTING TO THE LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY OF 1963 17
8. 4. ATTEMPTS TO HIDE NUCLEAR TESTS: THE BIG-HOLE EVASION SCHEME 40
9. 5. U.S. OVERESTIMATION OF SIZES OF SOVIET UNDERGROUND EXPLOSIONS: 1961–1974 55
10. 6. NEW METHODS TO IDENTIFY UNDERGROUND TESTS: 1963–1973 62
11. 7. CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS ON A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN 75
12. 8. PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS 83
13. 9. HEATED CONTROVERSIES OVER YIELDS OF SOVIET TESTS AND AN UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT AT A CTBT 91
14. 10. CONTINUED DEBATE ABOUT YIELDS, ACCUSATIONS OF SOVIET CHEATING ON THE THRESHOLD TREATY, AND ITS ENTRY INTO FORCE 103
15. 11. RENEWED INTEREST IN A CTBT, THE OTA REPORT, AND THE GROUP OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS: 1979–1996 127
16. 12. DEALING WITH “PROBLEM” OR “ANOMALOUS” EVENTS IN THE USSR AND RUSSIAN REPUBLIC: 1972–2009 143
17. 13. NEGOTIATING THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN: GLOBAL MONITORING, 1993–2016 159
18. 14. MONITORING NUCLEAR TESTS SITES AND COUNTRIES OF SPECIAL CONCERN TO THE UNITED STATES 174
19. 15. SENATE REJECTION OF THE CTBT IN 1999 195
20. 16. THE CTBT TASK FORCE AND THE 2002 AND 2012 REPORTS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES 211
21. 17. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS: SOVIET AND U.S. PARITY 232
22. 18. NUCLEAR WAR, FALSE ALARMS, ACCIDENTS, ARMS CONTROL, AND WAYS FORWARD 242
23. Glossary and Abbreviations 259
24. References 263
25. Index 269