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6. NEW METHODS TO IDENTIFY UNDERGROUND TESTS: 1963–1973
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Lynn R. Sykes
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Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter i
- CONTENTS v
- Acknowledgments ix
- Introduction xi
- 1. A HURRIED TRIP TO MOSCOW IN 1974 TO NEGOTIATE THE THRESHOLD NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY 1
- 2. DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 7
- 3. FROM THE EARLY NEGOTIATIONS TO HALT NUCLEAR TESTING TO THE LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY OF 1963 17
- 4. ATTEMPTS TO HIDE NUCLEAR TESTS: THE BIG-HOLE EVASION SCHEME 40
- 5. U.S. OVERESTIMATION OF SIZES OF SOVIET UNDERGROUND EXPLOSIONS: 1961–1974 55
- 6. NEW METHODS TO IDENTIFY UNDERGROUND TESTS: 1963–1973 62
- 7. CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS ON A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN 75
- 8. PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS 83
- 9. HEATED CONTROVERSIES OVER YIELDS OF SOVIET TESTS AND AN UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT AT A CTBT 91
- 10. CONTINUED DEBATE ABOUT YIELDS, ACCUSATIONS OF SOVIET CHEATING ON THE THRESHOLD TREATY, AND ITS ENTRY INTO FORCE 103
- 11. RENEWED INTEREST IN A CTBT, THE OTA REPORT, AND THE GROUP OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS: 1979–1996 127
- 12. DEALING WITH “PROBLEM” OR “ANOMALOUS” EVENTS IN THE USSR AND RUSSIAN REPUBLIC: 1972–2009 143
- 13. NEGOTIATING THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN: GLOBAL MONITORING, 1993–2016 159
- 14. MONITORING NUCLEAR TESTS SITES AND COUNTRIES OF SPECIAL CONCERN TO THE UNITED STATES 174
- 15. SENATE REJECTION OF THE CTBT IN 1999 195
- 16. THE CTBT TASK FORCE AND THE 2002 AND 2012 REPORTS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES 211
- 17. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS: SOVIET AND U.S. PARITY 232
- 18. NUCLEAR WAR, FALSE ALARMS, ACCIDENTS, ARMS CONTROL, AND WAYS FORWARD 242
- Glossary and Abbreviations 259
- References 263
- Index 269
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter i
- CONTENTS v
- Acknowledgments ix
- Introduction xi
- 1. A HURRIED TRIP TO MOSCOW IN 1974 TO NEGOTIATE THE THRESHOLD NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY 1
- 2. DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 7
- 3. FROM THE EARLY NEGOTIATIONS TO HALT NUCLEAR TESTING TO THE LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY OF 1963 17
- 4. ATTEMPTS TO HIDE NUCLEAR TESTS: THE BIG-HOLE EVASION SCHEME 40
- 5. U.S. OVERESTIMATION OF SIZES OF SOVIET UNDERGROUND EXPLOSIONS: 1961–1974 55
- 6. NEW METHODS TO IDENTIFY UNDERGROUND TESTS: 1963–1973 62
- 7. CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS ON A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN 75
- 8. PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS 83
- 9. HEATED CONTROVERSIES OVER YIELDS OF SOVIET TESTS AND AN UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT AT A CTBT 91
- 10. CONTINUED DEBATE ABOUT YIELDS, ACCUSATIONS OF SOVIET CHEATING ON THE THRESHOLD TREATY, AND ITS ENTRY INTO FORCE 103
- 11. RENEWED INTEREST IN A CTBT, THE OTA REPORT, AND THE GROUP OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS: 1979–1996 127
- 12. DEALING WITH “PROBLEM” OR “ANOMALOUS” EVENTS IN THE USSR AND RUSSIAN REPUBLIC: 1972–2009 143
- 13. NEGOTIATING THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN: GLOBAL MONITORING, 1993–2016 159
- 14. MONITORING NUCLEAR TESTS SITES AND COUNTRIES OF SPECIAL CONCERN TO THE UNITED STATES 174
- 15. SENATE REJECTION OF THE CTBT IN 1999 195
- 16. THE CTBT TASK FORCE AND THE 2002 AND 2012 REPORTS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES 211
- 17. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS: SOVIET AND U.S. PARITY 232
- 18. NUCLEAR WAR, FALSE ALARMS, ACCIDENTS, ARMS CONTROL, AND WAYS FORWARD 242
- Glossary and Abbreviations 259
- References 263
- Index 269