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Contents

© 1985, University of British Columbia Press

© 1985, University of British Columbia Press

Chapters in this book

  1. Frontmatter i
  2. Contents vii
  3. Preface ix
  4. I INTRODUCTION
  5. 1 Background for the Uninitiated 3
  6. II MORALITY AND THE POSSIBILITY OF RATIONAL COOPERATION
  7. 2 Prisoners, Paradox, and Rationality 45
  8. 3 Second Thoughts on Self-interest and Morality 59
  9. 4 Maximization Constrained: The Rationality of Cooperation 75
  10. 5 Prisoner's Dilemma and Resolute Choice 94
  11. III EVIDENTIAL VERSUS CAUSAL DECISION THEORY
  12. 6 Newcomb's Problem and Two Principles of Choice 107
  13. 7 Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of Expected Utility 133
  14. 8 Counterfactuals and Newcomb's Problem 159
  15. 9 Causality, Decision, and Newcomb's Paradox 183
  16. 10 Where the Tickle Defense Goes Wrong 214
  17. 11 Reply to Jackson and Pargetter 219
  18. 12 Newcomb's Problem: A Stalemate 223
  19. 13 Common Causes, Smoking, and Lung Cancer 234
  20. IV IS THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA A NEWCOMB PROBLEM?
  21. 14 Prisoners' Dilemma Is a Newcomb Problem 251
  22. 15 Is the Symmetry Argument Valid? 255
  23. 16 Not Every Prisoner's Dilemma Is a Newcomb Problem 263
  24. V COOPERATION IN REPEATED AND MANY-PERSON PRISONER'S DILEMMAS
  25. 17 The Insoluble Problem of the Social Contract 277
  26. 18 Utility Maximizers In Iterated Prisoner's Dilemmas 306
  27. 19 The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists 320
  28. 20 Individual Sanctions, Collective Benefits 339
  29. Biographical Notes 355
  30. Bibliography of Works Cited 358
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Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation
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https://doi.org/10.59962/9780774857154-toc

Chapters in this book

  1. Frontmatter i
  2. Contents vii
  3. Preface ix
  4. I INTRODUCTION
  5. 1 Background for the Uninitiated 3
  6. II MORALITY AND THE POSSIBILITY OF RATIONAL COOPERATION
  7. 2 Prisoners, Paradox, and Rationality 45
  8. 3 Second Thoughts on Self-interest and Morality 59
  9. 4 Maximization Constrained: The Rationality of Cooperation 75
  10. 5 Prisoner's Dilemma and Resolute Choice 94
  11. III EVIDENTIAL VERSUS CAUSAL DECISION THEORY
  12. 6 Newcomb's Problem and Two Principles of Choice 107
  13. 7 Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of Expected Utility 133
  14. 8 Counterfactuals and Newcomb's Problem 159
  15. 9 Causality, Decision, and Newcomb's Paradox 183
  16. 10 Where the Tickle Defense Goes Wrong 214
  17. 11 Reply to Jackson and Pargetter 219
  18. 12 Newcomb's Problem: A Stalemate 223
  19. 13 Common Causes, Smoking, and Lung Cancer 234
  20. IV IS THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA A NEWCOMB PROBLEM?
  21. 14 Prisoners' Dilemma Is a Newcomb Problem 251
  22. 15 Is the Symmetry Argument Valid? 255
  23. 16 Not Every Prisoner's Dilemma Is a Newcomb Problem 263
  24. V COOPERATION IN REPEATED AND MANY-PERSON PRISONER'S DILEMMAS
  25. 17 The Insoluble Problem of the Social Contract 277
  26. 18 Utility Maximizers In Iterated Prisoner's Dilemmas 306
  27. 19 The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists 320
  28. 20 Individual Sanctions, Collective Benefits 339
  29. Biographical Notes 355
  30. Bibliography of Works Cited 358
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