Chapters in this book

1. Frontmatter i
2. Contents vii
3. Preface ix
4. I INTRODUCTION
5. 1 Background for the Uninitiated 3
6. II MORALITY AND THE POSSIBILITY OF RATIONAL COOPERATION
7. 2 Prisoners, Paradox, and Rationality 45
8. 3 Second Thoughts on Self-interest and Morality 59
9. 4 Maximization Constrained: The Rationality of Cooperation 75
10. 5 Prisoner's Dilemma and Resolute Choice 94
11. III EVIDENTIAL VERSUS CAUSAL DECISION THEORY
12. 6 Newcomb's Problem and Two Principles of Choice 107
13. 7 Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of Expected Utility 133
14. 8 Counterfactuals and Newcomb's Problem 159
15. 9 Causality, Decision, and Newcomb's Paradox 183
16. 10 Where the Tickle Defense Goes Wrong 214
17. 11 Reply to Jackson and Pargetter 219
18. 12 Newcomb's Problem: A Stalemate 223
19. 13 Common Causes, Smoking, and Lung Cancer 234
20. IV IS THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA A NEWCOMB PROBLEM?
21. 14 Prisoners' Dilemma Is a Newcomb Problem 251
22. 15 Is the Symmetry Argument Valid? 255
23. 16 Not Every Prisoner's Dilemma Is a Newcomb Problem 263
24. V COOPERATION IN REPEATED AND MANY-PERSON PRISONER'S DILEMMAS
25. 17 The Insoluble Problem of the Social Contract 277
26. 18 Utility Maximizers In Iterated Prisoner's Dilemmas 306
27. 19 The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists 320
28. 20 Individual Sanctions, Collective Benefits 339
29. Biographical Notes 355
30. Bibliography of Works Cited 358