Bristol University Press
6 The Case against Neutrality
Abstract
In this chapter I consider and reject various leading arguments for liberal neutrality. I show that the extent of so called ‘reasonable’ disagreement about the good is much less than is often supposed. Much of the disagreement about ethics exist because of the human tendency to adopt the beliefs of one’s community. This tendency, rather than the limits of reason, better explains why many views continue to be widely held. Since children have a powerful interest in holding an epistemically reasonable conception of the good, they have an interest in being raised with a sound view of the good. I argue against the view that equal respect requires state neutrality, since respect for children requires giving them a good upbringing. Finally, I show why perfectionism for children need not be illegitimate.
Abstract
In this chapter I consider and reject various leading arguments for liberal neutrality. I show that the extent of so called ‘reasonable’ disagreement about the good is much less than is often supposed. Much of the disagreement about ethics exist because of the human tendency to adopt the beliefs of one’s community. This tendency, rather than the limits of reason, better explains why many views continue to be widely held. Since children have a powerful interest in holding an epistemically reasonable conception of the good, they have an interest in being raised with a sound view of the good. I argue against the view that equal respect requires state neutrality, since respect for children requires giving them a good upbringing. Finally, I show why perfectionism for children need not be illegitimate.
Chapters in this book
- Front Matter i
- Contents v
- Acknowledgements vi
- Introduction vii
-
Children and Moral Theory
- The Aims of a Moral Theory 3
- What is a Child? 9
-
A Distributive Theory for Children
- The Currency of Children’s Justice 17
- Welfare across the Lifespan 31
- Priority, Not Equality, of Welfare 43
-
Perfectionism and Upbringing
- The Case against Neutrality 55
- Understanding Perfectionism 67
- The Implications of Perfectionism 79
-
The Rights and Duties of Parents
- The Project View of Parenting 97
- Distributing Parental Duties 111
- Perfectionism and Parenting 123
- Beyond Parents: Collective Duties to Children 135
-
Distributive Implications
- Children’s Distributive Outcomes: Equality of Opportunity? 149
- Paying for Childcare 159
- Conclusion 171
- Bibliography 175
- Index 187
Chapters in this book
- Front Matter i
- Contents v
- Acknowledgements vi
- Introduction vii
-
Children and Moral Theory
- The Aims of a Moral Theory 3
- What is a Child? 9
-
A Distributive Theory for Children
- The Currency of Children’s Justice 17
- Welfare across the Lifespan 31
- Priority, Not Equality, of Welfare 43
-
Perfectionism and Upbringing
- The Case against Neutrality 55
- Understanding Perfectionism 67
- The Implications of Perfectionism 79
-
The Rights and Duties of Parents
- The Project View of Parenting 97
- Distributing Parental Duties 111
- Perfectionism and Parenting 123
- Beyond Parents: Collective Duties to Children 135
-
Distributive Implications
- Children’s Distributive Outcomes: Equality of Opportunity? 149
- Paying for Childcare 159
- Conclusion 171
- Bibliography 175
- Index 187
