Bristol University Press
5 Priority, Not Equality, of Welfare
Abstract
In this chapter I consider various possible distributive principles, that assess what a fair distribution of welfare would look like. I reject the principle of distributive equality because equality favours levelling down, making the lives of some people go worse while making no one’s life go better. In place I adopt the priority view, which suggests that the concern of justice should be promoting the welfare of the least advantaged children. I then consider the sufficiency principle, which holds that justice is about securing each person ‘enough’ and is unconcerned with advantages above this threshold. I argue that this sufficiency view should be rejected, even in its more plausible moderate forms, but that it does provide a useful intermediary role in working out what are the implications of prioritarianism.
Abstract
In this chapter I consider various possible distributive principles, that assess what a fair distribution of welfare would look like. I reject the principle of distributive equality because equality favours levelling down, making the lives of some people go worse while making no one’s life go better. In place I adopt the priority view, which suggests that the concern of justice should be promoting the welfare of the least advantaged children. I then consider the sufficiency principle, which holds that justice is about securing each person ‘enough’ and is unconcerned with advantages above this threshold. I argue that this sufficiency view should be rejected, even in its more plausible moderate forms, but that it does provide a useful intermediary role in working out what are the implications of prioritarianism.
Chapters in this book
- Front Matter i
- Contents v
- Acknowledgements vi
- Introduction vii
-
Children and Moral Theory
- The Aims of a Moral Theory 3
- What is a Child? 9
-
A Distributive Theory for Children
- The Currency of Children’s Justice 17
- Welfare across the Lifespan 31
- Priority, Not Equality, of Welfare 43
-
Perfectionism and Upbringing
- The Case against Neutrality 55
- Understanding Perfectionism 67
- The Implications of Perfectionism 79
-
The Rights and Duties of Parents
- The Project View of Parenting 97
- Distributing Parental Duties 111
- Perfectionism and Parenting 123
- Beyond Parents: Collective Duties to Children 135
-
Distributive Implications
- Children’s Distributive Outcomes: Equality of Opportunity? 149
- Paying for Childcare 159
- Conclusion 171
- Bibliography 175
- Index 187
Chapters in this book
- Front Matter i
- Contents v
- Acknowledgements vi
- Introduction vii
-
Children and Moral Theory
- The Aims of a Moral Theory 3
- What is a Child? 9
-
A Distributive Theory for Children
- The Currency of Children’s Justice 17
- Welfare across the Lifespan 31
- Priority, Not Equality, of Welfare 43
-
Perfectionism and Upbringing
- The Case against Neutrality 55
- Understanding Perfectionism 67
- The Implications of Perfectionism 79
-
The Rights and Duties of Parents
- The Project View of Parenting 97
- Distributing Parental Duties 111
- Perfectionism and Parenting 123
- Beyond Parents: Collective Duties to Children 135
-
Distributive Implications
- Children’s Distributive Outcomes: Equality of Opportunity? 149
- Paying for Childcare 159
- Conclusion 171
- Bibliography 175
- Index 187
