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  • FrancisHG Hutcheson
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Illustrations on the Moral Sense
This chapter is in the book Illustrations on the Moral Sense

Chapters in this book

  1. Frontmatter i
  2. Preface vii
  3. Contents ix
  4. Editor’s Introduction 1
  5. Illustrations on the Moral Sense
  6. Preface to An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections with Illustrations on the Moral Sense 105
  7. Contents 113
  8. Introduction 115
  9. Section I. Concerning the character of virtue, agreeable to truth or reason 120
  10. Section II. Concerning that character of virtue and vice, the fitness or unfitness of actions 141
  11. Section III. Mr. Wollaston’s significancy of truth, as the idea of virtue, considered 146
  12. Section IV. Showing the use of reason concerning virtue and vice, upon supposition that we receive these ideas by a moral sense 159
  13. Section V. Showing that virtue may have whatever is meant by merit and be rewardable upon the supposition that it is perceived by a sense and elected from affection or instinct 165
  14. Section VI. How far a regard to the Deity is necessary to make an action virtuous 175
  15. Appendix. The Correspondence between Gilbert Burnet and Francis Hutcheson 195
  16. Index 249
https://doi.org/10.4159/harvard.9780674184466.fm

Chapters in this book

  1. Frontmatter i
  2. Preface vii
  3. Contents ix
  4. Editor’s Introduction 1
  5. Illustrations on the Moral Sense
  6. Preface to An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections with Illustrations on the Moral Sense 105
  7. Contents 113
  8. Introduction 115
  9. Section I. Concerning the character of virtue, agreeable to truth or reason 120
  10. Section II. Concerning that character of virtue and vice, the fitness or unfitness of actions 141
  11. Section III. Mr. Wollaston’s significancy of truth, as the idea of virtue, considered 146
  12. Section IV. Showing the use of reason concerning virtue and vice, upon supposition that we receive these ideas by a moral sense 159
  13. Section V. Showing that virtue may have whatever is meant by merit and be rewardable upon the supposition that it is perceived by a sense and elected from affection or instinct 165
  14. Section VI. How far a regard to the Deity is necessary to make an action virtuous 175
  15. Appendix. The Correspondence between Gilbert Burnet and Francis Hutcheson 195
  16. Index 249
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