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Section III. Mr. Wollaston’s significancy of truth, as the idea of virtue, considered
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Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter i
- Preface vii
- Contents ix
- Editor’s Introduction 1
-
Illustrations on the Moral Sense
- Preface to An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections with Illustrations on the Moral Sense 105
- Contents 113
- Introduction 115
- Section I. Concerning the character of virtue, agreeable to truth or reason 120
- Section II. Concerning that character of virtue and vice, the fitness or unfitness of actions 141
- Section III. Mr. Wollaston’s significancy of truth, as the idea of virtue, considered 146
- Section IV. Showing the use of reason concerning virtue and vice, upon supposition that we receive these ideas by a moral sense 159
- Section V. Showing that virtue may have whatever is meant by merit and be rewardable upon the supposition that it is perceived by a sense and elected from affection or instinct 165
- Section VI. How far a regard to the Deity is necessary to make an action virtuous 175
- Appendix. The Correspondence between Gilbert Burnet and Francis Hutcheson 195
- Index 249
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter i
- Preface vii
- Contents ix
- Editor’s Introduction 1
-
Illustrations on the Moral Sense
- Preface to An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections with Illustrations on the Moral Sense 105
- Contents 113
- Introduction 115
- Section I. Concerning the character of virtue, agreeable to truth or reason 120
- Section II. Concerning that character of virtue and vice, the fitness or unfitness of actions 141
- Section III. Mr. Wollaston’s significancy of truth, as the idea of virtue, considered 146
- Section IV. Showing the use of reason concerning virtue and vice, upon supposition that we receive these ideas by a moral sense 159
- Section V. Showing that virtue may have whatever is meant by merit and be rewardable upon the supposition that it is perceived by a sense and elected from affection or instinct 165
- Section VI. How far a regard to the Deity is necessary to make an action virtuous 175
- Appendix. The Correspondence between Gilbert Burnet and Francis Hutcheson 195
- Index 249