Kapitel in diesem Buch

1. Frontmatter i
2. Contents ix
3. Preface xi
4. Introduction 1
5. I Corporate Governance and the Market for Corporate Control
6. 1 U.S. Corporate Governance: Lessons from the 1980s 9
7. 2 The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems 16
8. 3 Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy 63
9. II Agency Costs, Residual Claims, and Incentives
10. 4 Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure 83
11. 5 Stockholder, Manager, and Creditor Interests: Applications of Agency Theory 136
12. 6 Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination 168
13. 7 Organizational Forms and Investment Decisions 205
14. 8 The Distribution of Power among Corporate Managers, Shareholders, and Directors 227
15. Notes 251
16. References 277
17. Acknowledgments 301
18. Index 305