CHAPTER 16 Interest Group and Collective Choice Theory

Kapitel in diesem Buch

1. Frontmatter i
2. Contents v
3. Acknowledgments vii
4. CHAPTER 1 Introduction and Overview 1
5. CHAPTER 2 Why Courts Should Maximize Enactable Preferences When Statutes Are Unclear 23
6. PART I Current Preferences Default Rules
7. CHAPTER 3 The General Theory for Current Preferences Default Rules 41
8. CHAPTER 4 Inferring Current Preferences from Recent Legislative Action 70
9. CHAPTER 5 Inferring Current Preferences from Agency Action 79
10. PART II Enactor Preferences Default Rules
11. CHAPTER 6 From Legislative Intent to Probabilistic Estimates of Enactable Preferences 115
12. CHAPTER 7 Moderation, Unforseen Circumstances, and a Theory of Meaning 135
13. PART III Preference-Eliciting Default Rules
14. CHAPTER 8 Eliciting Legislative Preferences 151
15. CHAPTER 9 Canons Favoring the Politically Powerless 168
16. CHAPTER 10 Linguistic Canons of Statutory Construction 188
17. CHAPTER 11 Interpretations That May Create International Conflict 204
18. CHAPTER 12 Explaining Seeming Inconsistencies in Statutory Stare Decisis 211
19. PART IV Supplemental Default Rules
20. CHAPTER 13 Tracking the Preferences of Political Subunits 227
21. CHAPTER 14 Tracking High Court Preferences 234
22. PART V Objections
23. CHAPTER 15 The Fit with Prior Political Science Models and Empirical Data 243
24. CHAPTER 16 Interest Group and Collective Choice Theory 263
25. CHAPTER 17 Protecting Reliance or Avoiding Change or Effect 302
26. CHAPTER 18 Rebutting Operational and Jurisprudential Objections 324
27. Notes 337
28. Index 381