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Alliance Partner Choice in Markets with Vertical and Horizontal Externalities

  • Keisuke Hattori und Ming-Hsin Lin
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 8. Juni 2011

This study investigates the choice between complementary and parallel alliances in a market with vertical and horizontal externalities. One composite goods firm competes with two components producers, each providing a complementary component of a differentiated composite good. Although the joint profits from a parallel alliance between the composite goods firm and a components producer are always larger than those from a complementary alliance between components producers, through Nash bargaining, a components producer prefers the complementary (parallel) alliance when the degree of product differentiation is sufficiently large (small). Combined with the result that a complementary alliance is socially preferable, our findings provide meaningful implications for antitrust policy.

Published Online: 2011-6-8

©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston

Heruntergeladen am 18.11.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.2202/1935-1704.1732/pdf?lang=de
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