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The Benefit of Mixing Private Noise into Public Information in Beauty Contest Games
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Hiroki Arato
Veröffentlicht/Copyright:
21. März 2011
The authorities often disclose their economic forecasts to the public ambiguously. The more ambiguous the way in which they present the information, the more variously market participants interpret such announcements. Hence, an ambiguous public announcement mixes some private noise to the authorities’ economic forecasts. Using Keynesian beauty contest games, as in Morris and Shin (2002), we find that mixing private noise into public information is often socially beneficial. We also derive the optimal information dissemination policy and find that (i) for a given level of ambiguity, it may be better not to release information, and (ii) if ambiguity can be chosen freely, it is optimal to release the most precise information, but with an appropriate degree of ambiguity.
Published Online: 2011-3-21
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
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Artikel in diesem Heft
- Advances Article
- Strategy-Proof Compromises
- Make-or-Buy Decisions and the Manipulability of Performance Measures
- Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Goods
- A Property of Solutions to Linear Monopoly Problems
- Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information
- No-Trade in the Laboratory
- Symmetry or Dynamic Consistency?
- Contributions Article
- When Two-Part Tariffs are Not Enough: Mixing with Nonlinear Pricing
- Sellers Like Clusters
- Network Architecture and the Left-Right Spectrum
- Information, Authority, and Corporate Hierarchies
- The Benefit of Mixing Private Noise into Public Information in Beauty Contest Games
- Intertemporal Bounded Rationality as Consideration Sets with Contraction Consistency
- The Survival Assumption in Intertemporal Economies
- A New Existence and Uniqueness Theorem for Continuous Games
- Multiproduct Duopoly with Vertical Differentiation
- Topics Article
- Sequential Investments, Know-How Transmission, and Optimal Organization
- Input Production Joint Venture
- On the Existence and Social Optimality of Equilibria in a Hotelling Game with Uncertain Demand and Linear-Quadratic Costs
- Stochastic Stability in Finitely Repeated Two Player Games
- Alliance Partner Choice in Markets with Vertical and Horizontal Externalities
- Transitional Dynamics in a Tullock Contest with a General Cost Function
- Strategic Choice of Preferences: the Persona Model
- Implementation of the Core in College Admissions Problems When Colleagues Matter
Schlagwörter für diesen Artikel
beauty contest games;
information structure;
public announcement;
social welfare
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Advances Article
- Strategy-Proof Compromises
- Make-or-Buy Decisions and the Manipulability of Performance Measures
- Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Goods
- A Property of Solutions to Linear Monopoly Problems
- Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information
- No-Trade in the Laboratory
- Symmetry or Dynamic Consistency?
- Contributions Article
- When Two-Part Tariffs are Not Enough: Mixing with Nonlinear Pricing
- Sellers Like Clusters
- Network Architecture and the Left-Right Spectrum
- Information, Authority, and Corporate Hierarchies
- The Benefit of Mixing Private Noise into Public Information in Beauty Contest Games
- Intertemporal Bounded Rationality as Consideration Sets with Contraction Consistency
- The Survival Assumption in Intertemporal Economies
- A New Existence and Uniqueness Theorem for Continuous Games
- Multiproduct Duopoly with Vertical Differentiation
- Topics Article
- Sequential Investments, Know-How Transmission, and Optimal Organization
- Input Production Joint Venture
- On the Existence and Social Optimality of Equilibria in a Hotelling Game with Uncertain Demand and Linear-Quadratic Costs
- Stochastic Stability in Finitely Repeated Two Player Games
- Alliance Partner Choice in Markets with Vertical and Horizontal Externalities
- Transitional Dynamics in a Tullock Contest with a General Cost Function
- Strategic Choice of Preferences: the Persona Model
- Implementation of the Core in College Admissions Problems When Colleagues Matter
