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Stochastic Stability in Finitely Repeated Two Player Games
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Jack Robles
Veröffentlicht/Copyright:
27. April 2011
We apply stochastic stability to undiscounted finitely repeated two player games without common interests. We prove an Evolutionary Feasibility Theorem as an analog to the Folk Theorem (Benoit and Krishna, 1985 and 1987). Specifically, we demonstrate that as repetitions go to infinity, the set of stochastically stable equilibrium payoffs converges to the set of individually rational and feasible payoffs. This derivation requires stronger assumptions than the Nash Folk Theorem (Benoit and Krishna, 1987). It is demonstrated that the stochastically stable equilibria are stable as a set, but unstable as individual equilibria. Consequently, the Evolutionary Feasibility Theorem makes no prediction more specific than the entire individually rational and feasible set.
Published Online: 2011-4-27
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
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Artikel in diesem Heft
- Advances Article
- Strategy-Proof Compromises
- Make-or-Buy Decisions and the Manipulability of Performance Measures
- Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Goods
- A Property of Solutions to Linear Monopoly Problems
- Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information
- No-Trade in the Laboratory
- Symmetry or Dynamic Consistency?
- Contributions Article
- When Two-Part Tariffs are Not Enough: Mixing with Nonlinear Pricing
- Sellers Like Clusters
- Network Architecture and the Left-Right Spectrum
- Information, Authority, and Corporate Hierarchies
- The Benefit of Mixing Private Noise into Public Information in Beauty Contest Games
- Intertemporal Bounded Rationality as Consideration Sets with Contraction Consistency
- The Survival Assumption in Intertemporal Economies
- A New Existence and Uniqueness Theorem for Continuous Games
- Multiproduct Duopoly with Vertical Differentiation
- Topics Article
- Sequential Investments, Know-How Transmission, and Optimal Organization
- Input Production Joint Venture
- On the Existence and Social Optimality of Equilibria in a Hotelling Game with Uncertain Demand and Linear-Quadratic Costs
- Stochastic Stability in Finitely Repeated Two Player Games
- Alliance Partner Choice in Markets with Vertical and Horizontal Externalities
- Transitional Dynamics in a Tullock Contest with a General Cost Function
- Strategic Choice of Preferences: the Persona Model
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