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Identifying Community Structures from Network Data via Maximum Likelihood Methods
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Jernej Copic
, Matthew O. Jackson and Alan Kirman
Published/Copyright:
September 27, 2009
Networks of social and economic interactions are often influenced by unobserved structures among the nodes. Based on a simple model of how an unobserved community structure generates networks of interactions, we axiomatize a method of detecting the latent community structures from network data. The method is based on maximum likelihood estimation.
Published Online: 2009-9-27
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
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Keywords for this article
networks;
communities;
community structures;
maximum likelihood;
social networks
Articles in the same Issue
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- Private Information of Nonpaternalistic Altruism: Exaggeration and Reciprocation of Generosity
- Satisficing: A 'Pretty Good' Heuristic
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- Topics Article
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- Directed Search, Rationing and Wage Dispersion
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- Product Variety, Scale Economies, and Environmental Taxes
- Market Competition and Lower Tier Incentives
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- Universal Service Obligations and Competition with Asymmetric Information
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