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On the Similarity of Bilateral Harm and Unilateral Harm with Role-Type Uncertainty
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Tim Friehe
Veröffentlicht/Copyright:
20. Dezember 2007
This paper shows that unilateral-harm contexts with role-type uncertainty can create incentives similar to bilateral-harm contexts. For this purpose, we show that the result of Dharmapala and Hoffmann (2005), namely that standard liability rules do not lead to efficient care choices by injurer and victim if precaution costs are interdependent and harm is unilateral whereas they can in the case of bilateral harm, depends on role-type certainty.
Published Online: 2007-12-20
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
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Artikel in diesem Heft
- Article
- The Law and Economics of Cedar-Apple Rust: State Action and Just Compensation in Miller v. Schoene
- Does Punishment Matter? A Refinement of the Inspection Game
- Optimal Law Enforcement when the Offender can Dispose of his Wealth
- Rationalizing Drennan: On Irrevocable Offers, Bid Shopping and Binding Range
- Searching for Efficient Enforcement: Officer Characteristics and Racially Biased Policing
- Redistribution Mechanisms
- Using the Event Study Methodology to Measure the Social Costs of Litigation - A Re-Examination Using Cases from the Automobile Industry
- Comparative Causation and Economic Efficiency: When Activity Levels are Constant
- Less Crime, More (Vulnerable) Victims: Game Theory and the Distributional Effects of Criminal Sanctions
- Property Rights to Radio Spectrum in Guatemala and El Salvador: An Experiment in Liberalization
- Economic Analysis of Law in North America, Europe and Israel
- Path Dependence or Convergence? The Evolution of Corporate Ownership Around the World
- On the Similarity of Bilateral Harm and Unilateral Harm with Role-Type Uncertainty
- The Division of Profit in Sequential Innovation for Probabilistic Patents
- Accuracy Enhancement, Agency Costs, and Disclosure Regulation
