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Less Crime, More (Vulnerable) Victims: Game Theory and the Distributional Effects of Criminal Sanctions
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Ehud Guttel
Published/Copyright:
December 11, 2007
Harsh sanctions are conventionally assumed to primarily benefit vulnerable targets. Contrary to this perception, this article shows that augmented sanctions often serve the less vulnerable targets. While decreasing crime, harsher sanctions also induce the police to shift enforcement efforts from more to less vulnerable victims. When this shift is substantial, augmented sanctions exacerbate—rather than reduce—the risk to vulnerable victims. Based on this insight, this article suggests several normative implications concerning the efficacy of enhanced sanctions, the importance of victims’ funds, and the connection between police operations and apprehension rates.
Published Online: 2007-12-11
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
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Articles in the same Issue
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- The Law and Economics of Cedar-Apple Rust: State Action and Just Compensation in Miller v. Schoene
- Does Punishment Matter? A Refinement of the Inspection Game
- Optimal Law Enforcement when the Offender can Dispose of his Wealth
- Rationalizing Drennan: On Irrevocable Offers, Bid Shopping and Binding Range
- Searching for Efficient Enforcement: Officer Characteristics and Racially Biased Policing
- Redistribution Mechanisms
- Using the Event Study Methodology to Measure the Social Costs of Litigation - A Re-Examination Using Cases from the Automobile Industry
- Comparative Causation and Economic Efficiency: When Activity Levels are Constant
- Less Crime, More (Vulnerable) Victims: Game Theory and the Distributional Effects of Criminal Sanctions
- Property Rights to Radio Spectrum in Guatemala and El Salvador: An Experiment in Liberalization
- Economic Analysis of Law in North America, Europe and Israel
- Path Dependence or Convergence? The Evolution of Corporate Ownership Around the World
- On the Similarity of Bilateral Harm and Unilateral Harm with Role-Type Uncertainty
- The Division of Profit in Sequential Innovation for Probabilistic Patents
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