Limited Observation in Mutual Consent Networks
-
Michael McBride
This paper studies mutual consent social networks in which individuals imperfectly monitor others' network ties and have incomplete information about the benefits of network participation. I introduce the Conjectural Pairwise Stability concept, which generalizes Jackson and Wolinsky's (1996) Pairwise Stability concept to allow for limited observation, and apply it to a specific mutual consent network formation game. While limited observation generally leads to the existence of less efficient stable networks, I find that it can also lead to the existence of efficient stable networks. Moreover, stability restrictions considered in previous work lose their refining power as observation becomes more limited.
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Advances Article
- Evolutionary Dynamics and Long-Run Selection
- Party Competition under Private and Public Financing: A Comparison of Institutions
- Limited Observation in Mutual Consent Networks
- Status Concerns and Occupational Choice Under Uncertainty
- Choice under Limited Uncertainty
- A Vague Theory of Choice over Time
- Strategic Implications of Uncertainty over One's Own Private Value in Auctions
- Contributions Article
- Snobs and Quality Gaps
- General Option Exercise Rules, with Applications to Embedded Options and Monopolistic Expansion
- Liars and Inspectors: Optimal Financial Contracts When Monitoring is Non-Observable
- Inefficiency in a Bilateral Trading Problem with Cooperative Investment
- A Spatial Election with Common Values
- Is Sustainable Development Compatible with Rawlsian Justice?
- Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market
- The Uniqueness of Stable Matchings
- Assessing the Likelihood of Panic-Based Bank Runs
- Are Manufacturers Competing through or with Supermarkets? A Theoretical Investigation
- Existence of Equilibrium for Segmented Markets Models with Interest Rate Monetary Policies
- Affiliated Common Value Auctions with Differential Information: The Two Bidder Case
- The Emergence of a Price System from Decentralized Bilateral Exchange
- Finite Memory Distributed Systems
- Topics Article
- Special Interest Politics and Endogenous Lobby Formation
- Robust Portfolio Selection with and without Relative Entropy
- Increased Risk-Bearing with Background Risk
- Resources as an Input of Production in a Two-Sector Economy
- Why the Reserve Price Should Not Be Kept Secret
- A Strategic Analysis of Terrorist Activity and Counter-Terrorism Policies
- The Role of Observability in Futures Markets
- An Amendment to Baumol's Burden Test
- Pareto Improving Lotteries and Voluntary Public Goods Provision
- Endogenous Favoritism in Organizations
- Age Bias in Fiscal Policy: Why Does the Political Process Favor the Elderly?
- Fundamental and Secondary R&D Races
- Rat Races and Glass Ceilings
- On the Number of Contestants and Equilibrium Individual Effort
- Vertical Differentiation: Multiproduct Strategy to Face Entry?
- Rational Sabotage in Cooperative Production with Heterogeneous Agents
- Competitive Externalities in Dynamic Monopolies with Stochastic Demand
- On the Signalling Role of Debt Maturity
- Equilibrium Uniqueness in a Cournot Model with Demand Uncertainty
- Monopoly Pricing over Time and the Timing of Investments
- Shirking and Squandering in Sharing Games
- Nonrevealing Equilibria and Consumption-Based Asset Pricing Models
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Advances Article
- Evolutionary Dynamics and Long-Run Selection
- Party Competition under Private and Public Financing: A Comparison of Institutions
- Limited Observation in Mutual Consent Networks
- Status Concerns and Occupational Choice Under Uncertainty
- Choice under Limited Uncertainty
- A Vague Theory of Choice over Time
- Strategic Implications of Uncertainty over One's Own Private Value in Auctions
- Contributions Article
- Snobs and Quality Gaps
- General Option Exercise Rules, with Applications to Embedded Options and Monopolistic Expansion
- Liars and Inspectors: Optimal Financial Contracts When Monitoring is Non-Observable
- Inefficiency in a Bilateral Trading Problem with Cooperative Investment
- A Spatial Election with Common Values
- Is Sustainable Development Compatible with Rawlsian Justice?
- Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market
- The Uniqueness of Stable Matchings
- Assessing the Likelihood of Panic-Based Bank Runs
- Are Manufacturers Competing through or with Supermarkets? A Theoretical Investigation
- Existence of Equilibrium for Segmented Markets Models with Interest Rate Monetary Policies
- Affiliated Common Value Auctions with Differential Information: The Two Bidder Case
- The Emergence of a Price System from Decentralized Bilateral Exchange
- Finite Memory Distributed Systems
- Topics Article
- Special Interest Politics and Endogenous Lobby Formation
- Robust Portfolio Selection with and without Relative Entropy
- Increased Risk-Bearing with Background Risk
- Resources as an Input of Production in a Two-Sector Economy
- Why the Reserve Price Should Not Be Kept Secret
- A Strategic Analysis of Terrorist Activity and Counter-Terrorism Policies
- The Role of Observability in Futures Markets
- An Amendment to Baumol's Burden Test
- Pareto Improving Lotteries and Voluntary Public Goods Provision
- Endogenous Favoritism in Organizations
- Age Bias in Fiscal Policy: Why Does the Political Process Favor the Elderly?
- Fundamental and Secondary R&D Races
- Rat Races and Glass Ceilings
- On the Number of Contestants and Equilibrium Individual Effort
- Vertical Differentiation: Multiproduct Strategy to Face Entry?
- Rational Sabotage in Cooperative Production with Heterogeneous Agents
- Competitive Externalities in Dynamic Monopolies with Stochastic Demand
- On the Signalling Role of Debt Maturity
- Equilibrium Uniqueness in a Cournot Model with Demand Uncertainty
- Monopoly Pricing over Time and the Timing of Investments
- Shirking and Squandering in Sharing Games
- Nonrevealing Equilibria and Consumption-Based Asset Pricing Models