Article
Licensed
Unlicensed
Requires Authentication
The Uniqueness of Stable Matchings
-
Simon Clark
Published/Copyright:
December 4, 2006
This paper analyses conditions on agents' preferences for a unique stable matching in models of two-sided matching with non-transferable utility. The No Crossing Condition (NCC) is sufficient for uniqueness; it is based on the notion that a person's characteristics, for example their personal qualities or their productive capabilities, not only form the basis of their own attraction to the opposite sex but also determine their own preferences. The paper also shows that a weaker condition, alpha-reducibility, is both necessary and sufficient for a population and any of its subpopulations to have a unique stable matching. If preferences are based on utility functions with agents' characteristics as arguments, then the NCC may be easy to verify. The paper explores conditions on utility functions which imply that the NCC is satisfied whatever the distribution of characteristics. The usefulness of this approach is illustrated by two simple models of household formation.
Keywords: uniqueness; matching; marriage; no crossing condition; supermodularity; Spence-Mirrlees single crossing condition
Published Online: 2006-12-4
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
You are currently not able to access this content.
You are currently not able to access this content.
Articles in the same Issue
- Advances Article
- Evolutionary Dynamics and Long-Run Selection
- Party Competition under Private and Public Financing: A Comparison of Institutions
- Limited Observation in Mutual Consent Networks
- Status Concerns and Occupational Choice Under Uncertainty
- Choice under Limited Uncertainty
- A Vague Theory of Choice over Time
- Strategic Implications of Uncertainty over One's Own Private Value in Auctions
- Contributions Article
- Snobs and Quality Gaps
- General Option Exercise Rules, with Applications to Embedded Options and Monopolistic Expansion
- Liars and Inspectors: Optimal Financial Contracts When Monitoring is Non-Observable
- Inefficiency in a Bilateral Trading Problem with Cooperative Investment
- A Spatial Election with Common Values
- Is Sustainable Development Compatible with Rawlsian Justice?
- Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market
- The Uniqueness of Stable Matchings
- Assessing the Likelihood of Panic-Based Bank Runs
- Are Manufacturers Competing through or with Supermarkets? A Theoretical Investigation
- Existence of Equilibrium for Segmented Markets Models with Interest Rate Monetary Policies
- Affiliated Common Value Auctions with Differential Information: The Two Bidder Case
- The Emergence of a Price System from Decentralized Bilateral Exchange
- Finite Memory Distributed Systems
- Topics Article
- Special Interest Politics and Endogenous Lobby Formation
- Robust Portfolio Selection with and without Relative Entropy
- Increased Risk-Bearing with Background Risk
- Resources as an Input of Production in a Two-Sector Economy
- Why the Reserve Price Should Not Be Kept Secret
- A Strategic Analysis of Terrorist Activity and Counter-Terrorism Policies
- The Role of Observability in Futures Markets
- An Amendment to Baumol's Burden Test
- Pareto Improving Lotteries and Voluntary Public Goods Provision
- Endogenous Favoritism in Organizations
- Age Bias in Fiscal Policy: Why Does the Political Process Favor the Elderly?
- Fundamental and Secondary R&D Races
- Rat Races and Glass Ceilings
- On the Number of Contestants and Equilibrium Individual Effort
- Vertical Differentiation: Multiproduct Strategy to Face Entry?
- Rational Sabotage in Cooperative Production with Heterogeneous Agents
- Competitive Externalities in Dynamic Monopolies with Stochastic Demand
- On the Signalling Role of Debt Maturity
- Equilibrium Uniqueness in a Cournot Model with Demand Uncertainty
- Monopoly Pricing over Time and the Timing of Investments
- Shirking and Squandering in Sharing Games
- Nonrevealing Equilibria and Consumption-Based Asset Pricing Models
Keywords for this article
uniqueness;
matching;
marriage;
no crossing condition;
supermodularity;
Spence-Mirrlees single crossing condition
Articles in the same Issue
- Advances Article
- Evolutionary Dynamics and Long-Run Selection
- Party Competition under Private and Public Financing: A Comparison of Institutions
- Limited Observation in Mutual Consent Networks
- Status Concerns and Occupational Choice Under Uncertainty
- Choice under Limited Uncertainty
- A Vague Theory of Choice over Time
- Strategic Implications of Uncertainty over One's Own Private Value in Auctions
- Contributions Article
- Snobs and Quality Gaps
- General Option Exercise Rules, with Applications to Embedded Options and Monopolistic Expansion
- Liars and Inspectors: Optimal Financial Contracts When Monitoring is Non-Observable
- Inefficiency in a Bilateral Trading Problem with Cooperative Investment
- A Spatial Election with Common Values
- Is Sustainable Development Compatible with Rawlsian Justice?
- Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market
- The Uniqueness of Stable Matchings
- Assessing the Likelihood of Panic-Based Bank Runs
- Are Manufacturers Competing through or with Supermarkets? A Theoretical Investigation
- Existence of Equilibrium for Segmented Markets Models with Interest Rate Monetary Policies
- Affiliated Common Value Auctions with Differential Information: The Two Bidder Case
- The Emergence of a Price System from Decentralized Bilateral Exchange
- Finite Memory Distributed Systems
- Topics Article
- Special Interest Politics and Endogenous Lobby Formation
- Robust Portfolio Selection with and without Relative Entropy
- Increased Risk-Bearing with Background Risk
- Resources as an Input of Production in a Two-Sector Economy
- Why the Reserve Price Should Not Be Kept Secret
- A Strategic Analysis of Terrorist Activity and Counter-Terrorism Policies
- The Role of Observability in Futures Markets
- An Amendment to Baumol's Burden Test
- Pareto Improving Lotteries and Voluntary Public Goods Provision
- Endogenous Favoritism in Organizations
- Age Bias in Fiscal Policy: Why Does the Political Process Favor the Elderly?
- Fundamental and Secondary R&D Races
- Rat Races and Glass Ceilings
- On the Number of Contestants and Equilibrium Individual Effort
- Vertical Differentiation: Multiproduct Strategy to Face Entry?
- Rational Sabotage in Cooperative Production with Heterogeneous Agents
- Competitive Externalities in Dynamic Monopolies with Stochastic Demand
- On the Signalling Role of Debt Maturity
- Equilibrium Uniqueness in a Cournot Model with Demand Uncertainty
- Monopoly Pricing over Time and the Timing of Investments
- Shirking and Squandering in Sharing Games
- Nonrevealing Equilibria and Consumption-Based Asset Pricing Models
