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Verlustpartizipation von Vorständen – Eine ökonomische Analyse der Herabsetzungsmöglichkeit von Vorstandsbezügen nach dem VorstAG

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Published/Copyright: March 22, 2016
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Abstract

This paper examines the loss participation of executives following the German law of adequacy of executive directors’ compensation (VorstAG). First I provide an overview and discussion of the relevant law’ contents. To examine the potential economic impact of the loss participation, a modified tournament model is introduced. The model implies that the aspired participation succeds only partially. Hence, the law might probably fail in it’s purpose of lowering executive directors’ compensation.

Online erschienen: 2016-3-22
Erschienen im Druck: 2013-4-1

© 2013 by Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart

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