English Summaries

Charisma, Or: The Power of a Distinction

The article critically examines a key category of Weberian sociology: charisma. The first point of departure is Weber’s conception, whose definition has become the locus classicus of international charisma research. Although Weber’s original conception of charisma still has an ontological imbalance, the sociologist turned the category relationally in the further course of his work and thus created a heuristic that is of central importance for both the sociology of domination and the study of religion.

However, this circumstance does not mean that Weber’s concept of charisma has not received criticism. Quite the contrary. Almost every Weber expert has criticised the category in question. For example, Weber’s historical conditions of charismatic authority are vague. The question remains open as to what distinguishes a charismatic prophet who electrifies the crowd from a charlatan or pseudo-prophet who is merely ridiculed for his religious message. Since this difference cannot be an ontological one, nothing general can be said about this question, but rather historical Tiefenschärfe is required at this point. The article illustrates this with a historical case study from the history of the Crusades: Peter the Hermit.

Secondly, Weber’s anthropocentric narrowing of the concept of charisma has been criticised by researchers. In fact, Weber’s theory has a bias towards personal charisma, whereas the charisma of things is noticeably relegated to the background. The work of Charles Stephen Jaeger has contributed to a sharpening of the problem awareness of researchers with regard to this narrow focus. However, the secularisation and universalisation of the category in question proposed by the medievalist are not convincing. If charisma, as suggested by Jaeger, or Richard Sennett, becomes an omnipresent, even everyday phenomenon, then the category in question simply loses its heuristic potential – this is the core thesis of this article. If one wants to hold on to the category of ‘charisma’, a different, a narrower conceptualisation seems necessary. To this end, an attempt is made here for the first time to redefine the category in question in a difference-theoretical and relational way, in order to sharpen its heuristic potential.

Charisma is to be defined as a form of power based on the distinction between transcendence and immanence. The term charisma is used whenever a person, a living being, an institution, an artefact, an idea or an action is lifted out of the realm of immanence and thus – and this seems essential – a power relationship arises or persists. The Weberian extraordinary nature of charisma is thus replaced by a specific distinction, which is not coincidentally the code of the religious system to which the phenomenon remains closely, if not exclusively, linked: the transcendence-immanence distinction. Only if someone or something can generate symbolic power as a result of this distinction – whether this is described in the sources as special sacrality, holiness or giftedness– should we speak of charisma. As already suggested by Weber, charisma is thus particularly close to the religious system, the communication of which, from a system-theoretical perspective, is based on the binary distinction between transcendence and immanence. For religion always takes place where transcendence, which is in itself indeterminable, is determined by immanent means, i. e., where the unavailable is transformed into the available. Like religious communication in general, charisma is thus also characterised by a peculiar, even typical paradox: The transcendence of the charisma-bearer is – at least from an analytical perspective – never absolute, but always remains tied back to immanence, is thus immanent transcendence or transcendent immanence. Or, in the words of the theologian: “The beyond is the power of this world.” (Troeltsch)

Beyond Unambiguity: Ambiguous Religious Ideas in Historically Transmitted Alevi Texts

The paper addresses the question of ambiguous religious ideas in historically transmitted texts of Alevi provenance. The study focuses on the production of ambiguities and aims to explore the motives and, in particular, the intentionality of ambiguities. The aim is to reconstruct the circumstances under which the ambiguities in the texts arose. For this purpose, the study draws on writings of the so-called Buyruk tradition and the poetry of the Safavid Shah Ismail I (1487–1524) – two sources dating back to the early Safavid period of the 16^th century that are considered constitutive for Alevis historically and today. As a case study, the paper discusses ideas on the central Alevi saint Imam Ali (600–661). In both types of sources, at least three clearly distinguishable and even conflicting conceptions of Ali emerge – beginning with a historical Ali, in which the Prophet Muhammad, as the actual preserver of divine knowledge, introduces Ali to the mystical teachings. Secondly, there is the perception of the cosmological equivalence of Muhammad and Ali, who are equally described as pre-existent light. Finally, Ali is seen as a manifestation of the divine and even as the creator of the world, described as more exalted than all prophets and saints – including Muhammad. On this third level, Ali is understood as the active side of God, facing people and the world, whereas beyond that a transcendent side of God remains. While the first two levels are different but complementary, the third level contradicts the first two levels.

In addition to differentiating the individual levels of the perception of Ali, the study offers various approaches to explain the ambiguous ideas. Accordingly, the paper discusses three explanations in more detail: The ambiguities in the analysed texts can be understood as products of historically varying discursive contexts, as deficient and unintentional, or as a result of a strategic and thus intended use. Firstly, the ambiguities may be due to the fact of the historical genesis of the texts. Especially in the case of text collections such as the Buyruk writings, ambiguities can be explained by different historical, cultural, or discursive backgrounds of the particular text segments and their combination in the final text. This means that in the final editing, different text segments were compiled that were written at different times, by different authors, in a different discursive context. Thus, varying discourses came together that had different approaches to Ali.

However, this approach does not explain ambiguities in texts that have been written by one and the same author. In such cases, the question arises as to whether the ambiguities are unintentional or intentional. Older Alevi research, in particular, considered ambiguous doctrines of Alevi authors to be due to a lack of reflection on their own teachings. This perception is based on an understanding of religious doctrines that is designed for coherence, according to which ambiguities appear as something unintentionally aberrant and deficient. Thus, the possibility that the authors could also be pursuing an intention or even a strategy with the ambiguities does not play a role in their considerations.

Therefore, the present study also investigates patterns in the ambiguities that might indicate intention and strategy. Among the different approaches, the idea that the authors intended to address different recipients with different concepts is discussed in more detail. Thus, the ambiguous Ali images seem to correlate with different addressees. Particularly in Ismail’s Sufi mysticism, people are categorised differently according to their attested progress on the path towards divine unity. In his poetry, he seems to address these spiritually differently categorised people and to define religious terms and ideas in a correspondingly ambiguous way. By this means, Ismail uses ambiguous terms to address different people according to their Sufi mystical development.

Belief in Conspiracies and Religious Faith: One Mode of Thinking

During the coronavirus pandemic, conspiracy “theories” are flourishing. In the Qanon-narrative, a “Deep State”, represented by a kraken with the Star of David, is said to keep hundreds of thousands of children imprisoned. An elixir of life from their blood is supposed to make the club of millionaires young again. The “Deep State” is building a new world order in secret. But Donald Trump would smash it and save the world. The coronavirus lockdown was said to be a feint of Trump to free the children. In another narrative, George Soros had the SARS-Cov-2-virus developed as a bioweapon to gain control over the world. Quite similarly, Bill Gates started the pandemic with the help of the WHO in order to implant a microchip via his vaccine to gain control over humankind. The pattern is always the same – a small, mighty group (of Jews) wants to control the world and harm humanity by moral perversion (supported by liberalism), by war, terror, and epidemic plague. This pattern is due to the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. This antisemitic pamphlet was produced by the Russian secret service in 1903 in order to stir up trouble in the camp of the anti-Czarists. The so-called Jewish World Conspiracy became the core of Hitler’s worldview, and the belief in it was the engine of the Third Reich. The Protocols are not a sui generis invention:

Literally, it is plagiarism, but the storyline can be traced back to the Revelation of John with its myth of the Antichrist. But there are even more reasons to identify the conspiracy narratives as apocalyptic myths. They all have specific psychological conditions in common – a narcissistic concept of self with low self-confidence is threatened by a frightening crisis that causes a deep feeling of impotence and lack of control. These feelings contradict the self-concept. In consequence, a narrative is invented that perverts reality but confirms the self-concept: it is the devil in the guise of the Antichrist (seemingly a human being) who assaults innocent victims. This “explanation” transforms the angst into anger which can dissipate in concrete people. And the new “secret knowledge” turns the former victims into an elite and restores control. Anger easily mobilizes violence, and violence gives a sense of power.

The conspiracy narratives show a way of thinking that can be found in myths. Social causation is preferred over physical causation, an intent is alleged; orientation points are arbitrarily set; the world is interpreted as a whole; relationships are constructed by selection and fiction with the aim of identifying patterns; there is no sense of linearly advancing time. This cognitive style is pictorial-emotional; fantastic, contradictory, and implausible. Apocalyptic myths and conspiracy narratives further reduce the complex reality to a monocausal explanation and a good/evil dichotomy.

Conspiracy narratives believe in a transcendent power – the devil. As a result, the norms of conduct of the “victims” become the foundation of the divine order. The “secret knowledge” allows feelings of the numinous, and the affirmation of the self-concept in the face of a contradictory reality grants the feeling of redemption. The belief determines further action. In summary, it can be called religious. On the other hand, several religious phenomena show the same conspiracy mentality: Christian Anti-Judaism, Christian fundamentalism, Islamic Daesh, national-religious Judaism, “Turkishness”, or Hindu nationalism for example.

The persistence of myth in the 21^st century indicates the activity of an anthropological constant. This constant can be explained by the operating principles of the brain and its biological programs, which neurobiology and psychobiology have found: Our self-concept is always egocentric, and our perception distorts reality to some extent. The enemy stereotype is one archaic mechanism of constructing group identity, social exclusion another one. Emotions are our first way to get information, cognition works in large part with heuristics – unconscious estimations. Both can mislead when the self-concept is threatened. The thinking of the child is dominated by wishfulness. Psychoanalysis calls it the Primary Process. It also dominates all mental states with reduced reflexive consciousness – hallucinations, psychosis, dreams. In adulthood it reemerges during strong emotional stress. Its cognitive style is that of the conspiracy narrations and myths, and it reflects the architecture of our memory – the way our brain stores information. The latest achievement of evolution is analytical-logical thinking. It needs a lot of training, is error-prone and blocked during emotional stress, especially in the case of cognitive dissonance. Then faith can overmatch even reality. The insights of neuro- and psychobiology show us that religious thinking is natural, scientific thinking is not.